ANNOTATIONSSource:
Amended and adopted June 25, 1998, effective January 1, 1999;
(b) amended June 1, 2000, effective July 1, 2000;
(b) corrected and effective June 27, 2000.
Editor's note:
This rule was previously numbered as
241.1.
Am. Jur.2d. See 7 Am. Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, SectionSection30-34.
Law reviews. For note, "Standards of Discipline for Attorneys
in Colorado and the Significance of the Code of Professional
Responsibility", see 50 Den. L.J. 207 (1973).
For article, "Avoiding Family Law Malpractice: Recognition and Prevention
-- Parts I and II", see 14 Colo. Law. 787 and 991 (1985).
Annotator's note.
The following annotations include cases decided under former
provisions similar to this rule.
Rule held constitutional.
Rule provides sufficient guidelines to impose attorney discipline
and is not, therefore, unconstitutionally vague in violation of due
process of law.
People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986);
People v. Varallo, 913 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1996).
Bill of rights freedoms should not be prevented. The supreme court
should never make an order which would prevent any lawyer, or association of
lawyers, from enjoying to the fullest the fundamental freedoms contained in the
bill of rights.
In re Petition of Colo. Bar Ass'n, 137 Colo. 357, 325 P.2d 932 (1958).
There is lodged in the supreme court exclusive power to admit applicants
to the bar of this state, to prescribe the rules to be followed in the
discipline of lawyers, and to revoke a license to practice law or otherwise
assess penalties in disciplinary proceedings where the conduct of the
lawyer accused either amounts to a violation of law or involves moral
turpitude or dishonorable conduct; in all these matters full responsibility
rests with the court. In re Petition of Colo. Bar Ass'n, 137 Colo. 357,
325 P.2d 932 (1958);
People v. Varallo, 913 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1996).
Granting person permission to practice law is sole prerogative of supreme
court of Colorado. People v. Belfor, 200 Colo. 44, 611 P.2d 979 (1980)
(decided under prior rule).
And statute disqualifying a convicted felon of practicing as an attorney
in no wise interferes with the exclusive right of the supreme court to
determine
the rules and regulations which shall govern those seeking admission to the bar
nor does the statute impinge in any real sense the judicial right to discipline
those licensed to practice law. Rather, such a statute is an effort by the
general assembly under its police power to bar convicted felons from practicing
law in the courts, which the general assembly has the power to do so, since it
does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.
People v. Buckles, 167 Colo. 64, 453 P.2d 404 (1968).
The supreme court has the inherent power, apart from
rule or statute, as well as the duty, to suspend an attorney whose conduct
tends to obstruct or impede the administration of justice.
People v. Radinsky, 176 Colo. 357, 490 P.2d 951 (1971).
Supreme court authority in disciplinary proceedings is limited to
lawyers. In re Petition of Colo. Bar Ass'n, 137 Colo. 357, 325 P.2d 932 (1958).
Purpose of the bar and the admission requirements is to protect the
public from unqualified individuals who charge fees for providing
incompetent legal advice.
Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Grimes, 654 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1982).
The procedures in force which must be followed in actions for the
discipline of lawyers are defined in these rules on the discipline of
attorneys. In re Petition of Colo. Bar Ass'n, 137 Colo. 357, 325 P.2d 932 (1958).
These rules require that the pendency of investigations be strictly
confidential. In re Petition of Colo. Bar Ass'n, 137 Colo. 357, 325 P.2d 932 (1958).
No person acting as a representative of the supreme court has any power
or authority to express an opinion concerning the propriety or the ethics
of the conduct of any lawyer. In re Petition of Colo. Bar Ass'n, 137 Colo.
357, 325 P.2d 932 (1958).
In disciplinary proceedings the supreme court acts under
well-established rules which protect the attorney from possible unjust
public criticism until guilt is established under due process of law.
In re Petition of Colo. Bar Ass'n, 137 Colo. 357, 325 P.2d 932 (1958).
Previously, disciplinary action could not be taken merely for violating
standards of ethics. In re Petition of
Colo. Bar Ass'n, 137 Colo. 357, 325 P.2d 932 (1958).
To be actionable, it must have amounted to a violation of law, or involve
moral turpitude or dishonorable conduct. See In re Petition of
Colo. Bar Ass'n, 137 Colo. 357, 325 P.2d 932 (1958).
License to practice law assures public that the lawyer who holds the
license will perform basic legal tasks honestly and without undue delay,
in accordance with the highest standards of professional conduct. People
ex rel. Silverman v. Anderson, 200 Colo. 76, 612 P.2d 94 (1980);
People v. Meldahl, 200 Colo. 332, 615 P.2d 29 (1980);
People v. Witt, 200 Colo. 522, 616 P.2d 139 (1980);
People v. Dixon, 621 P.2d 322 (Colo. 1981);
People v. Kendrick, 646 P.2d 337 (Colo. 1982).
An attorney must adhere with dedication to the highest standards of
honesty and integrity in order that members of the public are assured
that they may deal with attorneys with the knowledge
that their matters will be handled with absolute propriety.
People v. Golden, 654 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1982).
As officers of the court, lawyers are charged with obedience to the
laws of this state and to the laws of the United States, and intentional
violation by them of these laws subjects them to the severest discipline.
People v. Wilson, 176 Colo. 389, 490 P.2d 954 (1971).
Attorney never to obstruct justice or judicial process.
An attorney has a high duty as an officer of the court to never participate
in any scheme to obstruct the administration of justice or the judicial process.
People v. Kenelly, 648 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1982); People v. Richards, 748 P.2d
341 (Colo. 1987).
Since a lawyer is an officer of the court, the court cannot tolerate or
allow fraud by a lawyer to go unpunished, for to declare such acts to be
unprofessional conduct would be to use the mildest of language.
People v. Radinsky, 176 Colo. 357, 490 P.2d 951 (1971).
Disciplining those who perpetrate fraud on courts is a sacred duty.
A most sacred duty is to maintain the integrity of the law profession by disciplining
lawyers who indulge in practices which are designed to perpetrate a fraud
on the courts. People v. Radinsky, 176 Colo. 357, 490 P.2d 951 (1971).
A lawyer who holds the position of district attorney,
with the substantial powers of that office, assumes responsibilities
beyond those of other lawyers and must be held to the highest standard
of conduct.
People v. Brown, 726 P.2d 638 (Colo. 1986).
Public expects appropriate discipline for misconduct.
The public has a right to expect that one who engages in professional
misconduct shall be disciplined appropriately.
People ex rel. Silverman v. Anderson, 200 Colo. 76, 612 P.2d 94 (1980);
People v. Meldahl, 200 Colo. 332, 615 P.2d 29 (1980);
People v. Witt, 616 P.2d 139 (Colo. 1980);
People v. Dixon, 621 P.2d 322 (Colo. 1981);
People v. Kendrick, 646 P.2d 337 (Colo. 1982).
Supreme court has, as part of inherent powers, ultimate and exclusive
responsibility for the structure and administration of disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers. People v. Susman, 196 Colo. 458, 587 P.2d 782
(1978);
Mulei v. Jet Courier Service, Inc., 860 P.2d
569 (Colo. App. 1993).
In a disciplinary proceeding,
the court's primary duty is to protect the public and the legal
profession from unscrupulous lawyers.
People v. Harfmann, 638 P.2d 745 (Colo. 1981);
People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986);
People v. Grenemyer, 745 P.2d 1027 (Colo. 1987).
Disciplinary proceedings are sui generis in nature,
and conviction of a criminal offense is not a condition
precedent to the institution of such proceedings nor does
acquittal constitute a bar to such proceedings.
People v. Harfmann, 638 P.2d 745 (Colo. 1981);
People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986).
Where the crime with which an attorney is charged is one of serious
consequences denoting moral turpitude, which he is found guilty of, he
cannot, in good conscience, be permitted to practice law in this state.
People v. Wilson, 176 Colo. 389, 490 P.2d 954 (1971).
Acts and conduct on the part of an attorney which establish that he is
incapable of being trusted, when coupled with acts of dishonesty and deceit,
render that person unworthy of public confidence and recognition by the courts.
People v. Radinsky, 176 Colo. 357, 490 P.2d 951 (1971).
Such acts should be promptly and severely punished. In that the
foundation of the legal profession is honor, if acts which a respondent has
committed are not promptly and severely punished, the public will not have
reason to trust those
lawyers who maintain the high standards of the profession.
People v. Radinsky, 176 Colo. 357, 490 P.2d 951 (1971).
Conduct of counsel found contrary to standard of honesty, justice, and
integrity. People v. Van Nocker, 176 Colo. 354, 490 P.2d 697 (1971).
Attorney is subject to jurisdiction of court even though disbarred for
failure to comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility while
practicing law as an officer of this court. People v. Richards, 748 P.2d 341
(Colo. 1987); People v. Koransky, 830 P.2d 490 (Colo. 1992);
People v. Vigil, 945 P.2d 1385 (Colo. 1997).
Attorney who is licensed to practice law in Colorado is subject to the jurisdiction
of the supreme court for violations of ethical obligations under the rules of professional
conduct that are committed while the license to practice is suspended. In re C de
Baca, 11 P.3d 426 (Colo. 2000).
Attorney who is a member of the Colorado bar is subject to the jurisdiction
of the supreme court and its grievance committee for professional misconduct
committed in another jurisdiction where attorney is licensed to practice law
despite fact that attorney does not maintain a law office in this state and has
not paid the required registration fee or satisfied the continuing legal
education requirements of this state. People v. Schindelar, 845 P.2d 1146
(Colo. 1993).
Applied in
People v. Hebeler, 638 P.2d 254 (Colo. 1981);
People v. Archuleta, 638 P.2d 255 (Colo. 1981);
People v. Gellenthien, 638 P.2d 295 (Colo. 1981);
People v. Proffitt, 731 P.2d 1257 (Colo. 1987);
People v. Turner, 758 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1988).
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