ANNOTATIONSSource:
Amended and adopted June 25, 1998, effective January 1, 1999.
Editor's note:
This rule was previously numbered as
241.7.
Am. Jur.2d.
See 7 Am. Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, SectionSection30-40.
C.J.S. See 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, SectionSection59, 88, 116.
Annotator's note.
The following annotations include cases decided under former
provisions similar to this rule.
Constitutionality upheld.
This rule provides sufficient guidelines to impose discipline to
comply with due process of law.
People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986);
People v. Varallo, 913 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1996).
Standards used in determining constitutional challenges.
Same standards used in determining a constitutional challenge
to a statute are used in determining constitutional challenge
to this rule.
People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986).
A statute passes constitutional muster for the purposes of imposing
professional discipline if it prescribes the possible penalties that
can be imposed for a violation of a statutory provision.
People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986).
An attorney-at-law is an officer of court exercising a privilege or
franchise to the enjoyment of which he has been admitted not as a matter of right,
but upon proof of fitness through evidence of his possession of satisfactory
legal attainments and fair private character.
People v. Howard, 147 Colo. 501, 364 P.2d 380 (1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 819, 82 S. Ct. 830, 7 L.Ed.2d 784 (1962).
An attorney is continually accountable to the court.
People v. Howard, 147 Colo. 501, 364 P.2d 380 (1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 819, 82 S. Ct. 830, 7 L.Ed.2d 784 (1962).
The privilege to practice law may at any time be declared forfeited for
misconduct, whether professional or nonprofessional, as shows him to be
an unfit or unsafe person to manage the business of others in the capacity
of an attorney. People v. Howard, 147 Colo. 501, 364 P.2d 380 (1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 819, 82 S. Ct. 830, 7 L.Ed.2d 784 (1962).
The power to declare a forfeiture of the privilege to practice
is a summary one inherent in the courts and exists not to mete out punishment
to an offender, but rather so that the administration of justice may be
safeguarded and the courts and the public protected from the misconduct
or unfitness of those who are licensed to perform the important functions
of the legal profession. People v. Howard, 147 Colo. 501, 364 P.2d 380 (1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 819, 82 S. Ct. 830, 7 L.Ed.2d 784 (1962).
It is not an adversary proceeding.
People v. Howard, 147 Colo. 501, 364 P.2d 380 (1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 819, 82 S. Ct. 830, 7 L.Ed.2d 784 (1962).
Where complaints are resolved against an attorney, the committee
may recommend public censure.
People v. Radinsky, 176 Colo. 357, 490 P.2d 951 (1971).
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer in an official
or governmental position knowingly misuses the position with the intent
to obtain a significant benefit or advantage for himself or another.
People v. Brown, 726 P.2d 638 (Colo. 1986).
Disbarment held not to be excessive.
Use of a license to practice law for the purpose of bringing into being
an illegal prostitution enterprise renders disbarment the only possible
from of discipline. Any lesser sanction would unduly depreciate such
misconduct in the eyes of the public and the legal profession.
People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986).
Disbarment may be recommended when attorney found guilty of crime.
Where the committee
finds that the nature of a crime of which an attorney has been found
guilty is such as to render him an unfit person to be licensed to
practice law, he therefore should be disbarred, and the committee recommend
such disbarment. People v. Wilson, 176 Colo. 389, 490 P.2d 954 (1971).
Disciplinary recommendation of grievance committee is advisory only
and is not binding on the supreme court. See People v. Smith, 773 P.2d 528
Colo. 1989).
Disbarment was the only available remedy to protect the interest of the
public where attorney had been afforded multiple opportunities including
two suspensions and court ordered rehabilitation, and where attorney's
conduct
demonstrated (a) neglect of legal matters entrusted to him; (b)
misrepresentation to his client and the grievance committee; and (c) a
pattern of neglect followed by the respondent that had the potential of
causing serious injury to his clients.
People v. Susman, 787 P.2d 1119 (Colo. 1990).
Disbarment proper when attorney failed to timely answer complaint, put on
evidence at hearing on amount of damages, answer amended complaint which included
punitive damages that the court awarded and respond to grievance committee. The attorney
had history of prior discipline for seriously neglecting client matters. Additional aggravating
factors included the presence of multiple offenses, failing to cooperate in the disciplinary
proceedings, and having substantial experience in the practice of law. There were no
mitigating factors. In the Matter of Scott, 979 P.2d 572 (Colo. 1999).
Disbarment is appropriate, in the absence of aggravating or mitigating
factors, where lawyer knowingly converts client property and deceives
client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another and causes serious
injury to a client. People v. Mulligan, 817 P.2d 1028 (Colo. 1991).
In the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, disbarment is
generally appropriate when (a) a lawyer abandons the practice and causes
serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or (b) a lawyer knowingly
fails to perform services for a client and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client; or (c) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect
with respect to client matters and causes serious or potentially serious
injury to a client. People v Southern, 832 P.2d 946 (Colo. 1992).
The ultimate sanction for multiple charges of misconduct generally should
be greater than the sanction for the most serious conduct. People v. Schubert,
799 P.2d 388 (Colo. 1990).
Court makes 90-day suspension consecutive to previously imposed one year
and a day suspension where existing suspension imposed for unrelated conduct. In re
Meyers, 981 P.2d 143 (Colo. 1999).
Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other
disciplinary rules is sufficient to warrant suspension. People v. Smith,
828 P.2d 249 (Colo. 1992).
Maximum period of suspension was warranted in light of multiple instances
of misconduct and necessity for respondent to complete drug rehabilitation
program. People v. Schubert, 799 P.2d 388 (Colo. 1990); People v. Driscoll,
830 P.2d 1019 (Colo. 1992).
Attorney received suspension for charging excessive fee in another
state.
The action taken in the other state had resulted in the attorney's receipt of
a one-year conditional suspension. Usually the court will impose the same
discipline as that which was imposed in the foreign jurisdiction, but because
Colorado does not provide for conditional suspensions public censure was
deemed appropriate. People v. Nash, 873 P.2d 764 (Colo. 1994).
Applied in People v. Barbary, 164 Colo. 588, 437 P.2d 57 (1968);
People v. Creasey, 811 P.2d 40 (Colo. 1991).
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