Rule 251.20.Attorney Convicted of a Crime 
 (a)Proof of Conviction.  Except as otherwise provided by these Rules, a 
 certified copy of the judgment of conviction from the clerk of any 
 court of criminal jurisdiction 
 indicating that an attorney has been convicted of a crime in that court shall 
 conclusively 
 establish the existence of such conviction for purposes of disciplinary 
 proceedings in 
 this state and shall be conclusive proof of the commission of that crime by the 
 respondent. 
  
 (b)Duty to Report Conviction.  Every attorney subject to these Rules, 
 upon being convicted of a crime, except those misdemeanor traffic 
 offenses or traffic 
 ordinance violations, not including the use of alcohol or drugs, shall notify 
 the 
 Regulation Counsel in writing of such conviction within ten days after the date 
 of the 
 conviction.  In addition, the clerk of any court in this state in which the 
 conviction was 
 entered shall transmit to the Regulation Counsel within ten days after the date 
 of the 
 conviction a certificate thereof. 
  
 (c)Commencement of Disciplinary Proceedings Upon Notice of Conviction. 
 Upon receiving notice that an attorney subject to these Rules has 
 been convicted of a 
 crime, other than a serious crime as hereinafter defined, the Regulation 
 Counsel shall, 
 following an investigation as provided in these Rules, make a determination as 
 provided in C.R.C.P. 251.11 or refer the matter to the committee for further 
 proceedings 
 consistent with C.R.C.P. 251.12. 
  
 If the conviction is for a serious crime as hereinafter defined, the Regulation 
 Counsel shall obtain the record of conviction and prepare and file a complaint against 
 the respondent as provided in C.R.C.P. 251.14. 
  
 If a complaint is filed against a respondent pursuant to the provisions of this 
 Rule, the Regulation Counsel shall present proof of the criminal conviction and may 
 present any other evidence which the Regulation Counsel deems appropriate.  If the 
 respondent's criminal conviction is either proved or admitted, the respondent 
 shall have the right to be heard by the Hearing Board only on 
 matters of rebuttal of any 
 evidence presented by the Regulation Counsel other than proof of the 
 conviction. 
  
 (d)Conviction of a Serious Crime -- Immediate Suspension. The 
 Regulation Counsel shall report to the Supreme Court the name of any 
 attorney who has been 
 convicted of a serious crime, as hereinafter defined.  The Supreme Court shall 
 thereupon issue a citation directing the convicted attorney to show cause why 
 the 
 attorney's license to practice law should not be immediately suspended 
 pursuant to 
 C.R.C.P. 251.8.  Upon full consideration of the matter, the Supreme Court may 
 either 
 impose immediate suspension for a definite or indefinite period or may 
 discharge the 
 rule to show cause.  The fact that a convicted attorney is seeking appellate 
 review of the 
 conviction shall not limit the power of the Supreme Court to impose immediate 
 suspension. 
  
 (e)Serious Crime Defined. The term serious crime as used in these Rules 
 shall include: 
  
 (1)Any felony; and 
  
 (2)Any lesser crime a necessary element of which, as determined by its 
 statutory 
 or common law definition, involves interference with the administration of 
 justice, false 
 swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, willful extortion, misappropriation, or 
 theft; or an 
 attempt or conspiracy to commit such crime; or solicitation of another to 
 commit such crime. 
  
 (f)Notice to Clients and Others of Immediate Suspension.  An order of 
 immediate suspension of an attorney pursuant to this Rule shall 
 constitute a suspension 
 of the attorney for the purpose of the provisions of C.R.C.P. 251.28. 
  
 (g)Automatic Reinstatement From Immediate Suspension When Conviction 
 Reversed.  An attorney suspended under the provisions of this Rule 
 shall be reinstated to practice law immediately upon filing a certificate 
 demonstrating that the underlying 
 criminal conviction has been reversed; provided, however, that reinstatement of 
 the 
 attorney shall have no effect on any proceedings conducted pursuant to these 
 Rules 
 then pending against him. 
  
 (h)Conviction Defined. The term conviction as used in these Rules shall 
 include any ultimate finding of fact in a criminal proceeding that 
  an individual is guilty 
 of a crime, whether the judgment rests on a verdict of guilty, a plea of 
 guilty, or a plea 
 of nolo contendere, and irrespective of whether entry of judgment or imposition 
 of sentence is suspended or deferred by the court. 
  
 

                                                                
ANNOTATIONSSource: 
 Amended and adopted June 25, 1998, effective January 1, 1999. 
  
  
  
 Editor's note: 
 This rule was previously numbered as 
 241.16. 
  
  
  
 Annotator's note. 
 The following annotations include cases decided under former 
 provisions similar to this rule. 
  
 Attorney licensed to practice law in state of Colorado is subject to 
 discipline by Colorado supreme court in the event of his conviction of 
 a criminal offense in a foreign jurisdiction. 
 People v. Swope, 621 P.2d 321 (Colo. 1981). 
  
 Attorney's conduct while in office not only resulted in convictions 
 of second degree official misconduct, Section 18-8-405, and failure to 
 disclose a conflict of interest, Section 18-8-308, but 
 also flagrantly violated minimal standards of candor and honesty required 
 by attorneys and justified suspension.  People v. Tucker, 676 P.2d 680 (Colo. 
 1983). 
  
 Attorney pleading guilty to cultivation of marijuana and unlawful 
 possession of a controlled substance is subject to discipline.  While 
 convicted felon was not trafficking or dealing in illegal substances and 
 was instead engaged in horticultural preservation and storing substance for 
 others, suspension for three years is appropriate penalty.  People v. 
 McPhee, 728 P.2d 1292 (Colo. 1986). 
  
 Accepting illegal drugs for legal services is serious criminal 
 conduct warranting severe sanction even though it does not fit definition 
 of serious crime provided in rule.  People v. Davis, 768 P.2d 1227 (Colo. 
 1989). 
  
 Failure to report felony conviction in another state where crime 
 involved conversion of client funds justifies disbarment.  People v. 
 Hedicke, 785 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1990). 
  
 Attorney's failure to report felony conviction including counts 
 involving 
 proof of intent to defraud is sufficient for disbarment.  People v. Brunn, 
 764 P.2d 1165 (Colo. 1988); 
 People v. Vidakovich, 810 P.2d 1071 (Colo. 
 1991). 
  
 Failure to report felony convictions in another state for two counts of 
 failure to report income and two 
 counts of filing false income tax returns warrants three-year suspension and 
 payment of costs rather than disbarment in light of numerous mitigating 
 factors.  People v. Mandell, 813 P.2d 732 (Colo. 1991). 
  
 Failure to report felony conviction in another state for mail fraud 
 warrants disbarment in absence of mitigating factors and where aggravating 
 factor of a prior disciplinary record exists.  People v. Bollinger, 859 
 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1993). 
  
 Lack of prior disciplinary record insufficient to call for sanction less 
 than disbarment where attorney convicted of bank fraud.  People v. Terborg, 
 848 P.2d 346 (Colo. 1993). 
  
 Guilty plea followed by deferred judgment was a "conviction" and 
 failure 
 to report warranted public censure even though the conviction occurred 
 prior to the 
 adoption of a specific definition for the term "conviction" in this 
 section.  People v. 
 Barnthouse, 941 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1997). 
  
 Bar reinstatement required demonstration of possession of moral and 
 professional qualifications. 
 Where a state attorney had been convicted of failing to file his federal 
 income tax return and making false representations to a special agent of 
 the Internal Revenue Service regarding the filing of income tax returns, 
 and where the attorney was later found to have made a false statement in 
 his application to the Arizona State Bar by answering in the negative an 
 inquiry as to whether he had ever been questioned regarding the violation 
 of any law, he was suspended from the practice of law in Colorado for three 
 years, and was required to demonstrate upon application for reinstatement 
 that he possessed moral and professional qualifications for admission to 
 the bar of this state.  People v. Gifford, 199 Colo. 205, 610 P.2d 485 (1980). 
  
 Bankruptcy fraud is a serious crime as defined by rule.  People v. Brown, 
 841 P.2d 1066 (Colo. 1990). 
  
 Attorney's conviction of three counts of sexual assault on a child and 
 three counts of aggravated incest conclusively established where the court 
 notified him it intended to take judicial notice of the conviction and 
 attorney 
 neither responded to the substance of the notice nor denied the conviction 
 occurred.  Because of the nature and seriousness of the crimes for which the 
 attorney was convicted, disbarment was appropriate.  People v. Schwartz, 890 
 P.2d 82 (Colo. 1995). 
  
 Disbarment warranted for attorney convicted of criminal attempt to commit sexual 
 exploitation of a child, a class 4 felony.  People v. Damkar, 908 P.2d 1113 (Colo. 
 1996). 
  
 Attorney's violations constituted "serious crimes" as defined in 
 subsection 
 (e) of this rule where the attorney pleaded guilty to making and altering a 
 false and forged prescription for Phentermine, a controlled substance, 
 in violation of former Section 12-22-315, a class 5 felony, and of criminal 
 attempt to obtain a controlled substance by forgery and alteration in 
 violation 
 of Section 18-2-101 and former Section 12-22-315, a class 6 felony. 
 People v. Moore, 849 P.2d 40 (Colo. 1993). 
  
 Lack of prior disciplinary record insufficient to call  for sanction 
 less than disbarment where attorney convicted of bankruptcy fraud and for 
 conspiracy to commit bankruptcy fraud and other federal offenses.  People v. 
 Schwartz, 814 P.2d 793 (Colo. 1991). 
  
 Although attorney had not previously been disciplined, sanction of 
 disbarment was warranted where attorney's felony conviction for possession of a 
 firearm occurred while he was still on probation for a felony conviction for 
 possession of marijuana.  People v. Laquey, 862 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1993). 
  
 Conviction for aiding fugitive to flee warrants disbarment despite 
 lack of a prior disciplinary record.  People v. Bullock, 882 P.2d 1390 
 (Colo. 1994). 
  
 Respondent given two-year suspension for aiding and abetting aliens' 
 entry into 
 the United States and by advising clients to make misrepresentations for 
 such entry. 
 Such an act generally warrants disbarment, but respondent's full disclosure 
 during 
 proceedings, expression of remorse, and the fact that a prior offense was 
 remote in time 
 were mitigating factors.  Respondent also required to discontinue the 
 representation of 
 clients before INS and the Department of Labor.  People v. Boyle, 942 P.2d 
 1199 (Colo. 1997). 
  
 Disbarment is warranted for driving while impaired, marihuana possession, 
 improperly executing agreement without permission, and failing to perform 
 certain professional duties, despite the lack of a prior record.  People v. 
 Gerdes, 891 P.2d 995 (Colo. 1995). 
  
 Conviction of attempt to commit sexual assault in the second 
 degree on a 17-year-old high school student filing clerk working at 
 attorney's law firm is a serious crime as defined by the rule.  The 
 conviction together with sexual conduct toward a client warrant 
 disbarment.  People v. Dawson, 894 P.2d 756 (Colo. 1995). 
  
 Disbarment warranted for attorney convicted in Hawaii of second-degree 
 murder.  People v. Draizen, 941 P.2d 280 (Colo. 1997). 
  
 Disbarment warranted for writing nonsufficient funds checks while 
 practicing law during a period of suspension and committing several other 
 disciplinary 
 rules violations.  People v. Fager, 938 P.2d 138 (Colo. 1997). 
  
 Applied in 
 People ex rel. MacFarlane v. Harthun, 195 Colo. 38, 581 P.2d 716 (1978); 
 People v. Harfmann, 638 P.2d 745 (Colo. 1981); 
 People v. Loseke, 698 P.2d 809 (Colo. 1985); 
 People v. Proffitt, 731 P.2d 1257 (Colo. 1987); 
 People v. Geller, 753 P.2d 235 (Colo. 1988); 
 People v. Cantor, 753 P.2d 238 (Colo. 1988).