ANNOTATIONSSource:
Committee comment amended October 17, 1996, effective January 1, 1997.
COMMENT
Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to
practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful
failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offense carry
no
such implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of
offenses involving "moral turpitude." That concept can be construed to include
offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery and
comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for the
practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire
criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses
that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses
involving violence, dishonesty, or breach of trust, or serious interference
with the administration of justice are in that category. A pattern of
repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered
separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation.
A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law
upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The
provisions of Rule 1.2(d) concerning a good faith challenge to the
validity, scope, meaning or application of the law apply to challenges
of legal regulation of the practice of law.
Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going
beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can
suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of attorney. The
same is true of abuse of positions of private trust such as trustee,
executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or
manager of a corporation or other organization.
COMMITTEE COMMENT
The Committee added the proscriptions contained in C.R.Civ.P.
241.6 and DR 1-102(a)(6) of the Code.
Sexual relationships between a lawyer and a client raise many issues
regarding a lawyer's professional conduct. For example, in People v.
Good, 893 P.2d 101 (Colo. 1995), The Colorado Supreme Court held that
because of the risks inherent in a sexual relationship between a lawyer and a
client, such a relationship or even suggestions of such a relationship will
almost always violate Rule 8.4(h). See also People v. Bergner, 873
P.2d 726 (Colo. 1994).
ANNOTATION
Annotator's note.
Rule 8.4 is similar to
DR 1-102, DR 2-101, DR 2-103, DR 3-101, DR 7-102,
DR 8-101, and DR 9-101 as they
existed prior to the 1992 repeal and reenactment of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Relevant cases construing
DR 1-102 have been included under Rule 3.1, cases construing DR 2-101 have been
included under Rule 7.1, cases construing DR 2-103 have been included under
Rule 1.5, cases construing DR 3-101 have been included under Rule 5.5, cases
construing DR 8-101 have been included under Rule 3.5, and cases construing DR
7-102 and DR 9-101 have been included under Rule 1.2.
Attorney's refusal to return documents belonging to client's parents and
assertion of a retaining lien constitute conduct which is prejudicial to
the administration of justice. People v. Brown, 840 P.2d 1085 (Colo. 1992).
Lawyer violated paragraph (c) when he represented loan documents to be investment
agreements to circumvent a provision in the Colorado Liquor Code that restricts the
cross-ownership of businesses holding liquor licenses. In re Lopez, 980 P.2d 983
(Colo. 1999).
Failure of former district attorney to make ordered child support
payments
constitutes conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and conduct
that adversely reflects upon a lawyer's fitness to practice law. People v.
Primavera, 904 P.2d 883 (Colo. 1995).
Attorney who conditioned settlement agreement on plaintiffs not pursuing a
grievance against him violated paragraph (d) and constituted conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice. In re Lopez, 980 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1999).
Attorney signing substitute counsel's name to pleadings in a style different from his
own signature, without authority to sign in a representative capacity and without any
indication that he was signing in a representative capacity, violated this rule and warranted
a six-month suspension. People v. Reed, 955 P.2d 65 (Colo. 1998).
When considering discipline of attorneys who criticize judges, the New York
Times standard should be applied because of the interests in protecting attorney
speech critical of judges. Under the New York Times standard (New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)), a two-part inquiry applies in determining whether an
attorney may be disciplined for statements criticizing a judge: (1) Whether the
disciplinary authority has proven that the statement was a false statement of fact (or a
statement of opinion that necessarily implies an undisclosed false assertion of fact); and
(2) assuming the statement is false, whether the attorney uttered the statement with actual
malice--that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to its truth.
In re Green, 11 P.3d 1078 (Colo. 2000).
Public censure was appropriate for attorney who violated this rule by
simultaneously representing, as defendants in a quantum meruit and lis
pendens
suit initiated by a subcontractor, the homeowners, the general contractor,
the
bank holding deed of trust on homeowners property, and two other parties who
had contracted with contractor. Balancing the seriousness of the misconduct
with the factors in mitigation, and taking into account the respondent's
mental
state when he entered into the conflicts in representation, public censure is
appropriate. People v. Fritze, 926 P.2d 574 (Colo. 1996).
Public censure warranted where, although respondent did not notify his
clients and
opposing counsel of his suspension, he did notify the court early in
proceedings, did not go
forward with court proceedings while on suspension and no actual harm was
demonstrated to
any of his clients. People v. Dover, 944 P.2d 80 (Colo. 1997).
Stipulated agreement and recommendation of public censure with certain conditions
and monitoring based upon conditional admission of misconduct were warranted for
attorney who required that his associates sign a covenant that hindered a client's right to
choose his or her own lawyer by interfering with the client's right to discharge his or her
lawyer at any time, with or without cause. People v. Wilson, 953 P.2d 1292 (Colo. 1998).
Public censure was appropriate where attorney falsely testified that he had
automobile insurance at the time of an accident, but outcome of case was not thereby
affected. People v. Small, 962 P.2d 258 (Colo. 1998).
Knowingly deceiving a client by altering a settlement check generally would
warrant a 30-day suspension, however, because the client was uninjured by the deception
and the respondent had no previous discipline in 13 years of practice, public censure
was adequate. People v. Waitkus, 962 P.2d 977 (Colo. 1998).
One-year and one-day suspension warranted where respondent failed to
serve a cross-claim, failed to respond to several motions, failed to keep
client informed, advanced defense that was not warranted by the facts and
existing law, and misrepresented to client the basis for the judgment in
favor of the opposing party. People v. Genchi, 849 P.2d 28 (Colo. 1993).
Six-month penalty justified for attorney pleading guilty to making and
altering a false and forged prescription for a controlled substance and of
criminal attempt to obtain a controlled substance by forgery and
alteration, where mitigating factors included: (1) No prior disciplinary
history; (2) personal or emotional problems at time of misconduct; (3) full
and free disclosure by attorney to grievance committee; (4) imposition of
other penalties and sanctions resulting from criminal proceeding; (5)
demonstration of genuine remorse; and (6) relative inexperience in the
practice of law. People v. Moore, 849 P.2d 40 (Colo. 1993).
Six-month suspension appropriate for respondent convicted of drunken
driving offense and assault. People v. Shipman, 943 P.2d 458 (Colo.
1997); People v. Reaves, 943 P.2d 460 (Colo. 1997).
Multiple criminal and traffic convictions demonstrate a pattern of misconduct,
and the presence of multiple offenses warrants suspension for six months with the
requirement of reinstatement proceedings. People v. Van Buskirk, 962 P.2d 975 (Colo.
1998).
Demonstration of four conditions required for attorney publicly
censured after conviction of driving while ability impaired: Continue
psychotherapy, remain on antabuse, submit monthly reports regarding
progress on antabuse, and execute written authorization to therapist to
release medical information regarding status on antabuse. People v.
Rotenberg, 911 P.2d 642 (Colo. 1996).
Thirty-day suspension warranted where lawyer, who represented an
individual accused of first-degree murder, communicated with co-defendant
who also
was charged with first-degree murder and whose interests were adverse to
the lawyer's
client, without the knowledge or consent of the co-defendant's lawyers.
The potential for
harm was high in a first-degree murder case and the number of unauthorized
contacts
demonstrated more than negligence on the lawyer's part. People v. DeLoach,
944 P.2d
522 (Colo. 1997).
Stipulated agreement and recommendation of suspension for 30 days based upon
conditional admission of misconduct were warranted for attorney who committed unfair
insurance claim settlement practices and tortious conduct in handling insurance investigation
of fire claim that he was not competent to handle. People v. McClung, 953 P.2d 1282 (Colo.
1998).
Forty-five-day suspension warranted for attorney's professional
misconduct involving the improper collection of attorney's fees in six
instances. People v. Peters, 849 P.2d 51 (Colo. 1993).
Suspension of three months is appropriate when attorney engaged in
sexual
intercourse with dissolution of marriage client on one occasion, had a
history of
disciplinary sanctions, but cooperated with the disciplinary investigation.
People v. Barr, 929 P.2d 1325 (Colo. 1996).
Suspension for one year and one day appropriate where attorney, among
other disciplinary rule violations, violated paragraph (d) by failing to
pay attorney fees
until two years after a malpractice action against the attorney and
paragraph (h) by engaging in two non-sufficient funds transactions
involving his "special" account, and twenty-two non-sufficient funds
transactions in his personal account. People v. Johnson, 944 P.2d 524
(Colo. 1997).
Suspension for one year and one day appropriate where attorney had a selfish
or dishonest motive in retaining fees he received from clients that rightfully belonged to his
law firm, but had no prior disciplinary record and made a timely good faith effort to provide
restitution. People v. Bronstein, 964 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1998)
(overruled in In the Matter of Thompson, 991 P.2d 820 (Colo. 1999)).
Suspension for one year and one day warranted where attorney violated
paragraph (c) by knowingly submitting a false statement to the small business administration
for the purpose of obtaining a loan. People v. Mitchell, 969 P.2d 662 (Colo. 1998).
Suspension of one year and one day appropriate where attorney committed
offense of third-degree sexual assault on a client and recklessly accused a lawyer and judge
of having an improper ex parte communication. In re Egbune, 971 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1999).
Two-year suspension warranted when attorney entered Alford plea to
defer judgment on a charge of soliciting for child prostitution. People v.
Gritchen, 908 P.2d 70 (Colo. 1995).
Driving while under the influence of alcohol with an expired driver's license and no
proof of insurance, and accepting one ounce of cocaine as payment for legal services from
a person believed to be a client facing drug charges, warranted a three-year suspension.
People v. Madrid, 967 P.2d 627 (Colo. 1998).
Suspension for three years was appropriate in case involving
violation of
this rule and others, together with attorney's breach of his duty as
client's trustee to
protect his client, who was a particularly vulnerable victim that was
recuperating from a
serious head injury. People v. DeRose, 945 P.2d 412 (Colo. 1997).
Suspension of three years was appropriate for attorney who drove a vehicle on
at least four occasions after his driver's license was revoked and who also failed to appear
in two cases involving his illegal driving. People v. Hughes, 966 P.2d 1055 (Colo. 1998).
Suspension for one year and one day warranted where attorney failed to appear
in county court on a charge of driving under the influence. People v. Myers, 969 P.2d 701
(Colo. 1998).
A long period of suspension, rather than disbarment, is warranted when acts
complained of occurred before an earlier disciplinary action against the attorney and
mitigating factors exist. Attorney's actions were more properly viewed as a pattern of
misconduct. In re Van Buskirk, 981 P.2d 607 (Colo. 1999).
Behavior toward client that precipitated conflict on day of client's
criminal trial, forcing client's newly appointed public defender to seek a
continuance to have adequate time to prepare violates this rule. People v.
Brenner, 852 P.2d 456 (Colo. 1993).
Pushing another attorney in the courtroom, resulting in a conviction
for third-degree assault, warranted a 30-day suspension. People v. Nelson,
941 P.2d 922 (Colo. 1997).
Lawyer who imposed unauthorized charging lien and subsequently
failed to release such lien, and who testified at grievance
proceedings that he kept documents belonging to third parties in
order to protect his client's financial interests, which was the
first instance at which such a theory was raised, violated this
rule. Although the attorney's motives were dishonest and selfish,
the grievance against the attorney involved in multiple offenses, the
attorney violated a disciplinary rule at the grievance proceedings,
and the attorney failed to acknowledge wrongful nature of his
conduct, the mitigating factors included the fact that the attorney
had not been subject to prior grievances and the attorney was
relatively inexperienced. Thus, the appropriate sanction is public
censure. People v. Brown, 840 P.2d 1085 (Colo. 1992).
In determining appropriate sanction, it is not important whether
injured party
was attorney's client, when attorney-respondent was appointed
conservator. People
v. Vigil, 929 P.2d 1311 (Colo. 1996).
Conduct warranted one-year extension of attorney's suspension.
People v.
Silvola, 933 P.2d 1308 (Colo. 1997).
Disbarment warranted for respondent who continued to practice law while
under suspension. Respondent was suspended based upon conviction for
possession of cocaine, a class 3 felony, and upon release from prison
represented
to several persons that he was a licensed attorney and provided legal services
to those persons. Board's finding that respondent had a history of prior
discipline, a dishonest or selfish motive, displayed a pattern of misconduct,
had committed multiple offenses, had engaged in a bad faith obstruction of the
disciplinary process, had refused to acknowledge any wrongful conduct on his
part, had substantial experience in law, and could offer no mitigating factors
warranted disbarment. People v. Stauffer, 858 P.2d 694 (Colo. 1993).
Disbarment appropriate remedy where attorney neglected a legal matter,
misappropriated funds and property, abandoned client, engaged in fraud, evaded process, and
failed to cooperate in disciplinary investigation. People v. Hindman, 958 P.2d 463 (Colo.
1998).
Disbarment is the presumed sanction for knowing misappropriation of funds from
clients or one's law firm, barring significant mitigating circumstances. People v.
Guyerson, 898 P.2d 1062 (Colo. 1995); People v. Varallo, 913 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1996); In the
Matter of Thompson, 991 P.2d 820 (Colo. 1999) (overruling People v. Bronstein, 964 P.2d
514 (Colo. 1998)).
Disbarment appropriate when attorney accepted legal fees, performed
limited services,
abandoned the client, and then misappropriated the unearned fees.
People v. Kuntz, 942
P.2d 1206 (Colo. 1997).
Aiding client to violate custody order sufficient to justify
disbarment.
People v. Chappell, 927 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1996).
Conduct violating this rule sufficient to justify disbarment where
attorney continued to practice law when under suspension. People v. Redman,
902 P.2d 839 (Colo. 1995).
One-year and one-day suspension plus payment of restitution and costs
proper for attorney who induced a loan through misrepresentations,
assigned a promissory note obtained with proceeds of such loan without lender's
knowledge or consent, and misrepresented that sufficient funds were in trust
account to cover check. People v. Kearns, 843 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1992).
False statements by attorney in connection with an accident in which
the
attorney was at fault adversely reflects on attorney's fitness to
practice law. People v. Dieters, 935 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1997).
Pleading guilty to a single count of bank fraud evidences serious criminal
conduct warranting disbarment. People v. Terborg, 848 P.2d 346 (Colo. 1993).
Attorney's repeated assurances to client that he would file a motion for
reconsideration, his failure to do so, and his neglect of a legal matter
entrusted to him constitute disciplinary violations warranting suspension for
30 days where there are mitigating factors. People v. LaSalle, 848 P.2d
348 (Colo. 1993).
Attorney's neglect resulting in an untimely filing of an inadequate certificate of
review and dismissal of his client's case, combined with fact that certificate contained false
statements of material fact that attorney later repeated to an investigative counsel with the
office of disciplinary counsel, constituted disciplinary violations warranting a 45-day
suspension, despite mitigating factors. People v. Porter, 980 P.2d 536 (Colo. 1999).
Ninety-day suspension justified where attorney's failure to respond to
discovery requests resulted in default and entry of judgment against client for
$816,613. People v. Clark, 927 P.2d 838 (Colo. 1996).
Ninety-day suspension and order of restitution as a condition of reinstatement
was justified where attorney failed to pay court-ordered award of attorney's fees resulting
from his filing of a frivolous motion and then failed to appear at a deposition. People v.
Huntzinger, 967 P.2d 160 (Colo. 1998).
Thirty-day suspension appropriate where attorney failed to inform
U.S.
bankruptcy court in Colorado, in a hearing on a motion to remand the
matter to U.S.
bankruptcy court in Massachusetts, that an order of dismissal of the
bankruptcy
proceeding between the same parties had been entered in California. People
v. Farry,
927 P.2d 841 (Colo. 1996).
Lawyer advertisement containing false, misleading, deceptive, or unfair
statements violates this rule and warrants public censure where respondent
terminated referral service being advertised after the initial request for
investigation was filed and cooperated in disciplinary proceedings but had
received a past letter of admonition and had substantial experience in the
practice of law. People v. Carpenter, 893 P.2d 777 (Colo. 1995).
Public censure appropriate where attorney misrepresented the status of a
dismissed case to his client, the resultant actual harm to the client was only the cost of hiring
a new lawyer to pursue an appeal of the dismissal, the attorney's law firm reimbursed the
client for all fees it had collected, the attorney reimbursed the firm for such fees, the only
aggravating factor was a 1994 letter of admonition given to the attorney for improperly
communicating with a represented person, and mitigating factors included the absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive, remorse, and full and free disclosure in the disciplinary
proceedings. People v. Johnston, 955 P.2d 1051 (Colo. 1998).
Public censure appropriate where harm suffered by attorney's client was
speculative, attorney retracted his misrepresentations and admitted to his
client before the institution of disciplinary proceedings that he had done
nothing on the client's appeal, attorney had no prior discipline, he made full
and free disclosure of his misconduct to the grievance committee, and he
expressed remorse for his misconduct. People v. Nelson, 848 P.2d 351 (Colo.
1993).
Public censure appropriate where attorney neglected and made
misrepresentations in two separate legal matters. People v. Eagan, 902 P.2d
841 (Colo. 1995).
Public censure appropriate in light of mitigating circumstances for
possession of cocaine in violation of state and federal controlled substance
laws. People v. Gould, 912 P.2d 556 (Colo. 1996).
Public censure appropriate where respondent was convicted of driving while
ability impaired and had also appeared in court while intoxicated on two consecutive days.
People v. Coulter, 950 P.2d 176 (Colo. 1998).
Public censure appropriate for attorney who had been reprimanded in
Connecticut for failure to file federal income tax return and attorney had not been disciplined
before in Colorado. People v. Perkell, 969 P.2d 703 (Colo. 1998).
Public censure was warranted where attorney twice requested arresting
officers
in driving under the influence cases not to appear at license revocation
hearings
before the department of motor vehicles. People v. Carey, 938 P.2d 1166
(Colo. 1997).
Public censure was appropriate where significant mitigating factors were
present. Attorney was convicted of vehicular assault, a class 4 felony, and two counts
of driving under the influence of alcohol. The crimes are strict liability offenses for which
attorney must serve three years in the custody of the department of corrections, followed by
a two-year mandatory period of parole. Section 18-1-105(3) provides that, while he is
serving his sentence, attorney is disqualified from practicing as an attorney in any state
courts. The sentence and disqualification from practicing law are a significant "other
penalty[] or sanction[]" and therefore a mitigating factor in determining the level of
discipline. In re Kearns, 991 P.2d 824 (Colo. 1999) (decided under former C.R.C.P.
241.6(5)).
Public censure was warranted for attorney who prepared motions to
dismiss for his client's wife to sign when proceedings had been brought by
the
client's wife against the client and the client's wife was represented by
counsel and was not advised that she should contact her own lawyer before
signing the motions, nor asked if she wished to discuss the motions with her
lawyer before signing. Three letters of admonition for unrelated misconduct
also were an aggravating factor for purposes of determining the appropriate
level of discipline. People v. McCray, 926 P.2d 578 (Colo. 1996).
Public censure warranted for attorney's solicitation of prostitution
during
telephone call with wife of client whom he was representing in a
dissolution of marriage
proceeding. People v. Bauder, 941 P.2d 282 (Colo. 1997).
Public censure was warranted where attorney made inappropriate, harmful,
offensive, harassing, and sexually abusive comments to potential client. The mitigating
factors found by the hearing board do not compel a different result. People v. Meier, 954
P.2d 1068 (Colo. 1998).
Chief deputy district attorney's theft of less than $50
constitutes conduct warranting public censure where significant mitigating
factors exist. People v. Buckley, 848 P.2d 353 (Colo. 1993).
Two-year suspension was an adequate sanction where attorney neglected client
matters by representing that he would file a lawsuit and neglected to do so, engaged in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation by agreeing to represent
client and thereafter failing to advise the client of attorney's suspension, and where attorney
further engaged in misrepresentation by collecting legal fees and costs from client while
attorney was under suspension. People v. de Baca, 948 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1997).
Transferring various ownership interests to lawyer employees of firm
who did not
receive profits and were not managers warranted suspension of one year and
a day.
Suspension appropriate because attorney made misrepresentations and was
dishonest in such
transfers. People v. Reed, 942 P.2d 1204 (Colo. 1997).
Thirty-day suspension was appropriate discipline where attorney advised client
to take action in violation of child custody order but failed to warn her of criminal
consequences of such action. People v. Aron, 962 P.2d 261 (Colo. 1998).
Suspension of one year and one day was appropriate based on evidence of three
separate incidents in which the attorney physically assaulted his girlfriend. It was
immaterial that no charges had been filed in any of the incidents, because the acts alone
reflected adversely on the attorney's fitness to practice law. The fact that the attorney's
behavior was not directly related to his practice of law was a factor to be considered, but was
not conclusive. The attorney had failed to take any steps toward rehabilitation following the
incidents, and the three separate assaults showed a pattern of misconduct. Therefore, it was
appropriate to suspend the attorney and require him to demonstrate rehabilitation and
completion of a certified domestic violence treatment program as a condition of
reinstatement. People v. Musick, 960 P.2d 89 (Colo. 1998).
Suspension for three years, rather than disbarment, was appropriate where
violation of this rule and others caused serious harm to attorney's clients, but mitigating
factors were present, including no previous discipline in 14 years of practice, personal and
emotional problems, and cooperation and demonstrated remorse in proceedings. People v.
Henderson, 967 P.2d 1038 (Colo. 1998).
Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules, where
mitigating factors were present, warrants public censure. People v. Davis, 950 P.2d 586
(Colo. 1998).
Pleading guilty to one count of bribery evidences conduct warranting
disbarment. People v. Viar, 848 P.2d 934 (Colo. 1993).
Disbarment is warranted where attorney was convicted of felony offense of
forging a federal bankruptcy judge's signature and had engaged in multiple
types of other dishonest conduct and where there was an insufficient showing of
mental disability. People v. Goldstein, 887 P.2d 634 (Colo. 1994).
Disbarment is warranted where attorney was convicted in Hawaii of
second-degree murder. People v. Draizen, 941 P.2d 280 (Colo. 1997).
Disbarment is warranted for attorney convicted of one count of sexual assault on a
child, notwithstanding lack of a prior record of discipline. People v. Espe, 967 P.2d 159
(Colo. 1998).
Disbarment was appropriate, despite existence of mitigating factors,
where attorney violated paragraph (c) of this rule by misappropriating bar
association funds for his personal use and where such misappropriation was
knowing. People v. Motsenbocker, 926 P.2d 576 (Colo. 1996).
Disbarment was appropriate for knowing misappropriation of funds
despite fact respondent had not been previously disciplined. People v.
Dice, 947 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1997).
Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly misappropriates client funds in the
absence of extraordinary mitigating factors. Mitigating factors such as stress due to
prolonged divorce, personal financial losses, a serious motor vehicle accident, filing for
bankruptcy, a deteriorating law practice, and alcohol abuse were insufficient to deviate from
the rule that a clear and convincing showing of a knowing misappropriation of client funds
warrants disbarment. People v. Torpy, 966 P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1998).
Disbarment is only appropriate remedy for knowingly misappropriating
client funds, unless significant extenuating circumstances are present. In re Cleland, 2
P.3d 700 (Colo. 2000).
Attorney conduct violating this rule, in conjunction with other rules, sufficient to
justify disbarment when attorney knowingly commingled and misappropriated clients'
funds for his personal use, neglected filing a complaint in a case until it was barred by the
statute of limitations, failed to comply with court orders applicable to his child support
payments, and neglected two other cases causing default judgments to be entered against his
client, despite fact that one of the judgments was subsequently set aside. People v.
Gonzalez, 967 P.2d 156 (Colo. 1998).
Attorney who was the trustee of client's trust violated paragraph (h)
by
utilizing the trust's funds to loan money to his daughter and to purchase
his son-in-law's
parents' former residence for the purpose of leasing it back to them, and
by then failing to
take any legal action against them when they did not make lease payments.
People v.
DeRose, 945 P.2d 412 (Colo. 1997).
Previously disbarred attorney who violated this rule would be forced
to pay restitution to clients as a condition of readmission. People v.
Vigil, 945 P.2d 1385 (Colo. 1997).
Prior discipline for conduct violating this rule is an important factor in
determining the proper level of discipline, therefore disbarment is merited where
attorney continues to engage in misconduct. In re C de Baca, 11 P.3d 426 (Colo. 2000).
Conduct violating this rule, in conjunction with other disciplinary
rules, sufficient to justify disbarment where the attorney continued to practice
law while on suspension, repeatedly neglecting his clients and failing to take
reasonable steps to
protect clients' interests. People v. Fager, 938 P.2d 138 (Colo. 1997).
Conduct found to violate disciplinary rules.
People v. Brenner, 852 P.2d 452 (Colo. 1993).
Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules
is sufficient to justify public censure.
People v. Doherty, 908 P.2d 1120 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Woodrum, 911 P.2d 640 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Pooley, 917 P.2d 712 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Newman, 925 P.2d 783 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Yates, 952 P.2d 340 (Colo. 1998);
People v. Barr, 957 P.2d 1379 (Colo. 1998);
People v. Rolfe, 962 P.2d 981 (Colo. 1998).
Conduct violating this rule sufficient to justify public censure.
People v. Gonzalez, 933 P.2d 1306 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Meier, 954 P.2d 1068 (Colo. 1998);
In re Wilson, 982 P.2d 840 (Colo. 1999).
Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other
disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify suspension.
People v. Barr, 855 P.2d 1386 (Colo. 1993);
People v. Crews, 901 P.2d 472 (Colo. 1995);
People v. Kuntz, 908 P.2d 1110 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Sigley, 917 P.2d 1253 (Colo. 1996);
People v. McCaffrey, 925 P.2d 269 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Fager, 925 P.2d 280 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Hohertz, 926 P.2d 560 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Bates, 930 P.2d 600 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Reynolds, 933 P.2d 1295 (Colo. 1997);
People v. White, 935 P.2d 20 (Colo. 1997);
People v. McGuire, 935 P.2d 22 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Mason, 938 P.2d 133 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Kotarek, 941 P.2d 925 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Primavera, 942 P.2d 496 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Field, 944 P.2d 1252 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Wotan, 944 P.2d 1257 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Johnson, 946 P.2d 469 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Barnthouse, 948 P.2d 534 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Blunt, 952 P.2d 356 (Colo. 1998);
People v. Easley, 956 P.2d 1257 (Colo. 1998);
People v. Hanks, 967 P.2d 144 (Colo. 1998);
People v. Harding, 967 P.2d 153 (Colo. 1998);
In re Nangle, 973 P.2d 1271 (Colo. 1999);
In re Corbin, 973 P.2d 1273 (Colo. 1999);
In re Bobbitt, 980 P.2d 538 (Colo. 1999);
In re Meyers, 981 P.2d 143 (Colo. 1999);
In re Demaray, 8 P.3d 427 (Colo. 1999).
Conduct violating this rule sufficient to justify suspension.
People v. Farrant, 852 P.2d 452 (Colo. 1993);
People v. Graham, 933 P.2d 1321 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Dieters, 935 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Rudman, 948 P.2d 1022 (Colo. 1997);
In re Van Buskirk, 981 P.2d 607 (Colo. 1999);
In re Sather, 3 P.3d 403 (Colo. 2000).
Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other
disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify disbarment.
People v. Kelley, 840 P.2d 1068 (Colo. 1992);
People v. Walsh, 880 P.2d 766 (Colo. 1994);
People v. Marsh, 908 P.2d 1115 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Jenks, 910 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Jamrozek, 921 P.2d 725 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Ebbert, 925 P.2d 274 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Steinman, 930 P.2d 596 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Wallace, 936 P.2d 1282 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Mannix, 936 P.2d 1285 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Madigan, 938 P.2d 1162 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Odom, 941 P.2d 919 (Colo. 1997);
People v. McDowell, 942 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Sousa, 943 P.2d 448 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Jackson, 943 P.2d 450 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Schaefer, 944 P.2d 78 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Clyne, 945 P.2d 1386 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Crist, 948 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Roybal, 949 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Holmes, 951 P.2d 477 (Colo. 1998);
People v. Singer, 955 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1998);
People v. Holmes, 955 P.2d 1012 (Colo. 1998);
People v. Valley, 960 P.2d 141 (Colo. 1998);
People v. Skaalerud, 963 P.2d 341 (Colo. 1998);
In re Bilderback, 971 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1999);
In re Hugen, 973 P.2d 1267 (Colo. 1999);
In re Tolley, 975 P.2d 1115 (Colo. 1999);
In re Lopez, 980 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1999).
Conduct violating this rule sufficient to justify disbarment.
People v. Kelly, 840 P.2d 1068 (Colo. 1992);
People v. Townshend, 933 P.2d 1327 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Sichta, 948 P.2d 1018 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Nearen, 952 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1998).
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