ANNOTATIONSCOMMENT
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite
opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and may
take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a
client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer should act with commitment and
dedication
to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy on the client's
behalf. However, a lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage that
might
be realized for a client. A lawyer's work load should be controlled so that
each matter can be handled adequately.
Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than
procrastination. A client's interests can often be adversely affected
by the passage of time or the change of conditions; in extreme
instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, the
client's legal position may be destroyed. Even when the client's
interests are not affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay can
cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer's
trustworthiness.
Unless the relationship is terminated as provided in Rule 1.16, a
lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a
client. If a lawyer's employment is limited to a specific matter, the
relationship terminates when the matter has been resolved. If a lawyer
has served a client over a substantial period in a variety of matters,
the client sometimes may assume that the lawyer will continue to serve
on a continuing basis unless the lawyer gives notice of withdrawal.
Doubt about whether a client-lawyer relationship still exists should be
clarified by the lawyer, preferably in writing, so that the client will
not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is looking after client's affairs when
the lawyer has ceased to do so. For example, if a lawyer has handled a
judicial or administrative proceeding that produced a result adverse to
the client but has not been specifically instructed concerning pursuit
of an appeal, the lawyer should advise the client of the possibility of
appeal before relinquishing responsibility for the matter.
COMMITTEE COMMENT
The Committee added the second sentence to Rule 1.3 in order to
establish an enforceable standard as well as an affirmative obligation
to act with reasonable diligence and promptness. The second sentence
restates DR 6-101(A)(3).
ANNOTATION
Annotator's note.
Rule 1.3 is similar to
DR 6-101 and DR 7-101 as they
existed prior to the 1992 repeal and reenactment of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Relevant cases construing DR 6-101 have been included under Rule 1.1 and
cases construing DR 7-101 have been included under Rule 1.2.
Public censure appropriate where harm suffered by attorney's client was
speculative, attorney retracted his misrepresentations and admitted to his
client before the institution of disciplinary proceedings that he had done
nothing on the client's appeal, attorney had no prior discipline, he made
full
and free disclosure of his misconduct to the grievance committee, and he
expressed remorse for his misconduct. People v. Nelson, 848 P.2d 351 (Colo.
1993).
Public censure appropriate where attorney failed to review district
attorney's file and the transcript of the preliminary hearing before
trial. People v. Bonner, 927 P.2d 836 (Colo. 1996).
More severe sanction of public censure rather than private censure
warranted where attorney continued to rely on methods of communication
which
had previously failed even after it became evident that the settlement
agreement
would be withdrawn and the client's interests would be harmed. People v.
Podoll, 855 P.2d 1389 (Colo. 1993).
Public censure instead of private censure was appropriate where
attorney failed to respond to discovery requests and motions for summary
judgment and the findings of the board did not support the applicability of
ABA
Standard 9.32(i) as a mitigating factor since there was no medical evidence
that attorney was affected by chemical dependency or that alcohol contributed
to or caused the misconduct. People v. Brady, 923 P.2d 887 (Colo. 1996).
Public censure and monitoring conditions for one year, rather than private censure,
were appropriate where attorney had a history of private sanctions indicating a pattern
of misconduct. The attorney had also had a six-month suspension entered against him during
the same time period in which the acts giving rise to censure occurred. Had the acts occurred
following the suspension, public censure would be too lenient. People v. Field, 967 P.2d
1035 (Colo. 1998).
Aggravating and mitigating factors. The following factors are considered
aggravating when deciding the appropriate level of discipline: (1) Prior discipline, (2) a
pattern of misconduct, and (3) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process through total
non-cooperation with the disciplinary authorities. Failure to appear before the disciplinary
board will cause one to lose the ability to present evidence of mitigating factors. People v.
Stevenson, 980 P.2d 504 (Colo. 1999).
Attorney's restitution agreement was neither an aggravating nor mitigating
factor
since the attorney did not propose or attempt any form of restitution until
after a request for investigation had been filed with the office of
disciplinary counsel. People v. Brady, 923 P.2d 887 (Colo. 1996).
Attorney's argument that public discipline is not appropriate because it
would stigmatize a recovering alcoholic was rejected since overriding
concern in discipline proceedings is to protect the public through the
enforcement of professional standards of conduct. People v. Brady, 923 P.2d
887 (Colo. 1996).
Public censure appropriate where attorney allowed the statute of limitations
to run before filing a complaint on the client's personal injury claim.
People v. Hockley, 968
P.2d 109 (Colo. 1998).
Public censure appropriate where neglect extended over a long period
of time, respondent had no prior history of discipline, and the actual harm
caused by the misconduct was slight. People v. Berkley, 858 P.2d 699
(Colo. 1993).
Public censure appropriate for failure to submit settlement papers to
client and to take any further action
in the matter, in addition to other conduct violating rules. People v.
Berkley, 858 P.2d 699 (Colo. 1993).
Public censure appropriate where attorney neglected and made
misrepresentations in two separate legal matters. People v. Eagan, 902
P.2d 841 (Colo. 1995).
Public censure with additional conditions imposed on lawyer who neglected client's
matter and then misinformed client of its status. People v. Kram, 966 P.2d 1065 (Colo.
1998).
Public censure warranted where, although respondent did not notify his
clients and opposing counsel of his suspension, he did notify the court
early in proceedings, did not go forward with court proceedings while on
suspension and no actual harm was demonstrated to any of his clients.
People v. Dover, 944 P.2d 80 (Colo. 1997).
Forty-five-day suspension warranted where respondent neglected child custody
matter and had a prior public censure, a prior admonishment, and prior suspensions, but
where the respondent did not demonstrate a dishonest or selfish motive and exhibited a
cooperative attitude and expressions of remorse. People v. Dowhan, 951 P.2d 905 (Colo.
1998).
Attorney's inaction over a period of more than two years and other
disciplinary violations warrant suspension for 30 days where there are
mitigating factors. People v. LaSalle, 848 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1993).
Neglecting to file response to motion for summary judgment and to return
client files upon request was sufficient to result in one-year and one-day
suspension. People v. Honaker, 847 P.2d 640 (Colo. 1993).
Suspension for one year and one day appropriate when attorney neglected
to file response to motion for summary judgment and to return client files
upon
request. People v. Honaker, 847 P.2d 640 (Colo. 1993).
Suspension for one year and one day appropriate when lawyer neglects matters
of multiple clients and charges unreasonable fees. People v. Reedy, 966 P.2d 1057 (Colo.
1998).
Suspension for three years, the longest period available, was
appropriate in case where violation of this rule and others would otherwise
have justified disbarment but mitigating factors included personal and
emotional problems, interim rehabilitation, and remorse. People v.
McCaffrey, 925 P.2d 269 (Colo. 1996).
Suspension for three years was appropriate in case involving
violation of
this rule and others, together with attorney's breach of his duty as
client's trustee to
protect his client, who was a particularly vulnerable victim that was
recuperating from a
serious head injury. People v. DeRose, 945 P.2d 412 (Colo. 1997).
Suspension for three years, rather than disbarment, was appropriate where
violation of this rule and others caused serious harm to attorney's clients, but mitigating
factors were present, including no previous discipline in 14 years of practice, personal and
emotional problems, and cooperation and demonstrated remorse in proceedings. People v.
Henderson, 967 P.2d 1038 (Colo. 1998).
Three-year suspension warranted for attorney who effectively abandoned and failed
to communicate with clients. People v. Shock, 970 P.2d 966 (Colo. 1999).
Conduct warranted one-year extension of attorney's suspension.
People v. Silvola, 933 P.2d 1308 (Colo. 1997).
Disbarment appropriate remedy for attorney who neglected client's legal
matter, failed to return retainer after being requested to do so, abandoned
law
practice, evaded process, and failed to respond to request of grievance
committee. People v. Williams, 845 P.2d 1150 (Colo. 1993).
Attorney who failed to make sufficient efforts to ensure that his
client received timely payments from the trust for which he was the trustee
violated this rule. People v. DeRose, 945 P.2d 412 (Colo. 1997).
When a lawyer accepts fees from clients and then abandons those clients
while keeping their money and causing serious harm, disbarment is
appropriate. People v. Steinman, 930 P.2d 596 (Colo. 1997).
Previously disbarred attorney who violated this rule would be forced
to pay restitution to clients as a condition of readmission. People v.
Vigil, 945 P.2d 1385 (Colo. 1997).
Conduct violating this rule, in conjunction with other disciplinary
rules,
sufficient to justify disbarment where the attorney continued to practice
law while
on suspension, repeatedly neglecting his clients and failing to take
reasonable steps to
protect clients' interests. People v. Fager, 938 P.2d 138 (Colo. 1997).
Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules
is sufficient to justify public censure.
People v. Titoni, 893 P.2d 1322 (Colo. 1995);
People v. Doherty, 908 P.2d 1120 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Woodrum, 911 P.2d 640 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Murray, 912 P.2d 554 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Barbieri, 935 P.2d 12 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Williams, 936 P.2d 1289 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Buckingham, 938 P.2d 1157 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Todd, 938 P.2d 1160 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Doherty, 945 P.2d 1380 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Yates, 952 P.2d 340 (Colo. 1998);
People v. Barr, 957 P.2d 1379 (Colo. 1998);
People v. Kolko, 962 P.2d 979 (Colo. 1998).
Conduct violating this rule sufficient to justify public censure.
People v. Smith, 847 P.2d 1154 (Colo. 1993);
People v. Podoll, 855 P.2d 1389 (Colo. 1993);
People v. Essling, 893 P.2d 1308 (Colo. 1995);
People v. Belsches, 918 P.2d 559 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Gonzalez, 933 P.2d 1306 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Mohar, 935 P.2d 19 (Colo. 1997);
People v. White, 951 P.2d 483 (Colo. 1998).
Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other
disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify suspension.
People v. Farrant, 852 P.2d 452 (Colo. 1993);
People v. Barr, 855 P.2d 1386 (Colo. 1993);
People v. Crews, 901 P.2d 472 (Colo. 1995);
People v. Kuntz, 908 P.2d 1110 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Fager, 925 P.2d 280 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Hohertz, 926 P.2d 560 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Paulson, 930 P.2d 582 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Bates, 930 P.2d 600 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Reynolds, 933 P.2d 1295 (Colo. 1997);
People v. White, 935 P.2d 20 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Scott, 936 P.2d 573 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Harding, 937 P.2d 393 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Primavera, 942 P.2d 496 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Field, 944 P.2d 1252 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Wotan, 944 P.2d 1257 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Johnson, 946 P.2d 469 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Wright, 947 P.2d 941 (Colo. 1997);
People v. de Baca, 948 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Babinski, 951 P.2d 1240 (Colo. 1998);
People v. Rishel, 956 P.2d 542 (Colo. 1998);
In re Corbin, 973 P.2d 1273 (Colo. 1999);
In re Bobbitt, 980 P.2d 538 (Colo. 1999);
In re Demaray, 8 P.3d 427 (Colo. 1999).
Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other
disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify disbarment.
People v. Walsh, 880 P.2d 766 (Colo. 1994);
People v. Marsh, 908 P.2d 1115 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Jenks, 910 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Jamrozek, 921 P.2d 725 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Steinman, 930 P.2d 596 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Townshend, 933 P.2d 1327 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Madigan, 938 P.2d 1162 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Swan, 938 P.2d 1164 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Sousa, 943 P.2d 448 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Schaefer, 944 P.2d 78 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Clyne, 945 P.2d 1386 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Crist, 948 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Roybal, 949 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Holmes, 951 P.2d 477 (Colo. 1998);
People v. Holmes, 955 P.2d 1012 (Colo. 1998);
People v. Hindman, 958 P.2d 463 (Colo. 1998);
People v. Valley, 960 P.2d 141 (Colo. 1998);
People v. Skaalerud, 963 P.2d 341 (Colo. 1998);
People v. Gonzalez, 967 P.2d 156 (Colo. 1998);
In re Bilderback, 971 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1999);
In re Hugen, 973 P.2d 1267 (Colo. 1999);
In re Tolley, 975 P.2d 1115 (Colo. 1999);
In re Stevenson, 979 P.2d 1043 (Colo. 1999).
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