ANNOTATIONSCOMMENT
Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into
disrepute. Delay should not be indulged merely for the convenience of
the advocates, or for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party's
attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose. It is not a justification
that similar conduct is often tolerated by the bench and bar. The
question is whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard
the course of action as having some substantial purpose other than
delay. Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise improper
delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client.
COMMITTEE COMMENT
The Committee viewed this Rule as an important one and an
improvement over the Code in that it places on attorneys a positive
obligation to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation and it also
makes clear that delaying tactics engaged in solely for the purpose of
benefiting a client are improper.
ANNOTATION
Annotator's note.
Rule 3.2 is similar to
DR 1-102 and DR 7-101 as they
existed prior to the 1992 repeal and reenactment of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Relevant cases construing
DR 1-102 have been included under Rule 3.1 and cases
construing DR 7-101 have been included under Rule 1.2.
Conduct violating this rule in
conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify
suspension.
People v. Robinson, 853 P.2d 1145 (Colo. 1993);
People v. Barr, 855 P.2d 1386 (Colo. 1993).
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