Rule 3.5.Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal 
 A lawyer shall not: 
  
 (a)seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other 
 official by means prohibited by law; 
  
 (b)communicate ex parte with such a person except as permitted 
 by law; or 
  
 (c)engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal. 
  
 

                                                                
ANNOTATIONSCOMMENT 
 [1]Many forms of improper influence upon a tribunal are 
 proscribed by criminal law.  Others are specified in the ABA Model Code 
 of Judicial Conduct, with which an advocate should be familiar.  A 
 lawyer is required to avoid contributing to a violation of such 
 provisions. 
  
 [2]The advocate's function is to present evidence and 
 argument so that the cause may be decided according to law.  Refraining from 
 abusive or obstreperous conduct is a corollary of the advocate's right 
 to speak on behalf of litigants.  A lawyer may stand firm against abuse 
 by a judge but should avoid reciprocation; the judge's default is no 
 justification for similar dereliction by an advocate.  An advocate can 
 present the cause, protect the record for subsequent review and 
 preserve professional integrity by patient firmness no less effectively 
 than by belligerence or theatrics. 
  
 COMMITTEE COMMENT 
 The Committee felt that this provision was uncontroversial because 
 it simply makes it unethical to do what is already illegal and is very 
 similar to present Code provisions.  Section (c) was viewed as an 
 improvement because it is more specific than DR 7-106(C)(6) which 
 proscribes "undignified or discourteous" courtroom conduct. 
  
  
  
 ANNOTATION 
  
 Annotator's note. 
 Rule 3.5 is similar to 
 DR 7-101, DR 7-106, DR 7-108, DR 7-109, DR 7-110, and DR 8-101 
 as they existed prior to the 1992 repeal and reenactment of the Code of 
 Professional Responsibility.  Relevant cases construing 
 DR 7-108, DR 7-109, DR 7-100, and DR 8-101 have 
 been included in the annotations to this rule.  Cases construing DR 7-101 have 
 been included under Rule 1.2 and cases construing DR 7-106 have been included 
 under Rule 3.3. 
  
 Law reviews.  For article, "Ex Parte Communications with a Tribunal: 
 From Both Sides", see 29 Colo. Law. 55 (April 2000). 
  
 Cases Decided Under Former DR 7-108. 
 Jury tampering is basis for indefinite suspension of attorney. 
 People v. Radinsky, 176 Colo. 357, 490 P.2d 951 (1971). 
  
 Cases Decided Under Former DR 7-109. 
 Evidence sufficient to justify suspension from the practice of law. 
 People v. Belfor, 197 Colo. 223, 591 P.2d 585 (1979). 
  
 Cases Decided Under Former DR 7-110. 
 Suggesting that witness contact chief justice for attorney's benefit 
 justifies public censure. 
 Where an attorney suggested to a principal witness in a pending grievance 
 proceeding against that attorney that he write a letter on behalf of the 
 attorney to the chief justice of the state supreme court, 
 substantially recanting his testimony in the grievance proceeding, the 
 attorney's conduct violated the code of professional responsibility and 
 C.R.C.P. 241.6.  Public censure is the appropriate discipline for this 
 breach of professional obligations.  People v. Hertz, 638 P.2d 794 
 (Colo. 1982). 
  
 The imposition of a one-year suspension in Illinois for the loaning of 
 money to a judge warrants imposition of the same sanction in Colorado. 
 People v. Chatz, 788 P.2d 157 (1990). 
  
 Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules 
 is sufficient to justify disbarment. 
 People v. Bannister, 814 P.2d 801 (Colo. 1991). 
  
 Cases Decided Under Former DR 8-101. 
 District attorney not tribunal.  It is not the intent of paragraph 
 (A)(2) to treat a district attorney or those acting under him as a tribunal. 
 People ex rel. Gallagher v. Hertz, 198 Colo. 522, 608 P.2d 335 (1979).