ANNOTATIONSCOMMENT
The professional responsibility of a lawyer derives from
membership in a profession which has the duty of assisting members of
the public to secure and protect available legal rights and benefits.
Each member of our society is entitled to have his or her conduct judged
and regulated in accordance with the law; to seek any lawful objective
through legally permissible means; and to present for adjudication any
lawful claim, issue or defense.
[1]The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the
fullest benefit of the client's cause, but also a duty not to abuse
legal procedure. The law, both procedural and substantive, establishes
the limits within which an advocate may proceed. However, the law is
not always clear and never is static. Accordingly, in determining the
proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken of the law's ambiguities
and potential for change.
[2]The filing of an action or defense or similar action
taken for a client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first
been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital
evidence only by discovery. Such action is not frivolous even though
the lawyer believes that the client's position ultimately will not
prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the client desires to
have the action taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or
maliciously injuring a person or if the lawyer is unable either to make
a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the
action
taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law.
COMMITTEE COMMENT
The Committee felt that this provision is an improvement on DR
7-102(A) which makes it improper for a lawyer to "file a suit...when he
knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to
harass or maliciously injure." The Rule talks in terms of "frivolous"
actions, rather than in terms that seem to speak to the motivation of
the attorney. The Rule also seems preferable in that it sets out more
clearly an objective standard for evaluating the conduct of the
attorney. Some language from EC 7-1 was added at the start of the
Comments to the Rule to emphasize that this Rule is not inconsistent
with a lawyer's obligation to seek vigorously a client's lawful
objectives through lawful means.
ANNOTATION
Annotator's note.
Since Rule 3.1 is similar to
DR 1-102 as it
existed prior to the 1992 repeal and reenactment of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, relevant cases construing
that provision have been included in the annotations to this rule.
Public censure was appropriate where the attorney failed to cooperate
in a disciplinary investigation, made frivolous motions, and made a statement
with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity
concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge. People v. Thomas, 925
P.2d 1081 (Colo. 1996).
A violation of this rule must be proved by clear and convincing evidence in a
disciplinary proceeding. Therefore, the fact that a district court had found by a
preponderance of the evidence that an attorney had made a frivolous motion did not preclude
the hearing board from determining that the attorney had not violated this rule. In re Egbune,
971 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1999).
Conduct violating this rule in
conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify
suspension. People v. Robinson, 853 P.2d 1145 (Colo. 1993).
Cases Decided Under Former DR 1-102.
I.General Consideration.
II.Disciplinary Actions.
A.Public Censure.
B.Suspension.
C.Disbarment.
I.GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Law reviews. For article, "Incriminating Evidence: What to do With
a Hot Potato", see 11 Colo. Law. 880 (1982).
For article, "The Ethical Obligation to Disclose Attorney Negligence", see
13 Colo. Law. 232 (1984).
For article, "Indemnification or Contribution Among Counsel in Legal
Malpractice Actions", see 14 Colo. Law. 563 (1985). For article, "The
Lawyer's Duty to Report Ethical Violations", see 18 Colo. Law. 1915 (1989).
For article, "Update on Ethics and Malpractice Avoidance in Family Law --
Part I", see 19 Colo. Law. 465 (1990).
For article, "Update on Ethics and Malpractice Avoidance in Family Law --
Part II", see 19 Colo. Law. 647 (1990).
For formal opinion of the Colorado Bar Association Ethics Committee
on Use of Subpoenas in Civil Proceedings, see 19 Colo. Law.
1556 (1990).
For article, "Punishing Ethical Violations: Aggravating and Mitigating
Factors", see 20 Colo. Law. 243 (1991).
For article, "Sex, Lawyers and Vilification", see 21 Colo. Law. 469 (1992).
Constitutionality upheld.
This rule is not unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied.
People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986).
Standards used in determining a constitutional challenge
to a statute are used in determining a constitutional challenge to this rule.
People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986).
Presumption of constitutionality attaches to such enactment, and the
burden is on the party challenging an enactment to demonstrate its
unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986).
Since a disciplinary rule is promulgated for the purpose of guiding
lawyers in their professional conduct, and is not directed to the
public at large, the central consideration in resolving a vagueness
challenge should be whether the nature of the proscribed conduct
encompassed by the rule is readily understandable to a licensed lawyer.
People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986).
Attorney's psychological problems considered as aggravating and
mitigating circumstances in arriving at a recommendation for discipline.
The presence of psychological problems, however, does not automatically prevent
the attorney from assisting in his own defense where evidence is shown to
the contrary. People v. Belina, 765 P.2d 121 (Colo. 1988).
Attorney's conduct was so careless or reckless as to constitute
sufficient showing of knowledge for violation of subsection (A)(4) of this
disciplinary rule. People v. Rader, 822 P.2d 950 (Colo. 1992).
In order to find that attorney engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation in violation of this
disciplinary rule, it must be shown that attorney had culpable mental state greater than simple
negligence. People v. Rader, 822 P.2d 950 (Colo. 1992).
Failure to respond to inquiries from referral service, to pay
consultation
charges and forwarding fees to service, and to return case status reports to
service constitutes a violation of sections (A)(1), (A)(4), and (A)(6).
People v. Taylor, 799 P.2d 930 (Colo. 1990).
Attorney's conduct violated section (A)(4), (A)(5), (A)(6), and DR
2-106(A), where the attorney's multiple billing practice resulted in the
charging or collection of a clearly excessive fee because the compensation
claimed
bore no rational relationship to the work performed and exceeded the
compensation authorized by law. People v. Walker, 832 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1992).
Attorney's conduct violated sections (A)(4) and (A)(5) where the
attorney failed to file applications for approval of fees in a bankruptcy
case, did not seek court approval of compensation after the bankruptcy
petition was
filed, and left the state while the case was pending without providing his
client means of contacting him. These actions, aggravated by a previous
public censure, warranted a 60-day suspension. People v. Mills, 923 P.2d 116
(Colo. 1996).
Hearing board should not have found violations of sections (A)(4) and (A)(5) where
board absolved attorney of the charges the complaint advised him to defend. By failing
to find a violation for the failure to disclose certain payments until ordered to do so, the
board should not have proceeded with finding that attorney committed misconduct in not
detailing the sources of the disputed income. In re Quiat, 979 P.2d 1029 (Colo. 1999).
Board erred in concluding that attorney's representation of individual client with
whom he had a business relationship constituted conduct adversely reflecting on attorney's
fitness to practice law. Neither complainant's expert nor hearing board paid sufficient
attention to the specific and unusual facts of the general and limited partnerships' actual or
potential liabilities. The record does not support the board's findings that an actual conflict
existed among the general and limited partners, including the attorney, or that potential for
conflict was likely. In re Quiat, 979 P.2d 1029 (Colo. 1999).
An attorney's appearance as counsel of record in numerous court
proceedings following an order of suspension constituted a violation of DR
1-102(A)(4). People v. Kargol, 854 P.2d 1267 (Colo. 1993).
Attorney's effort to cause suppression of relevant evidence at driver
license revocation proceeding in a manner not authorized by statute or
other law constitutes conduct prejudicial to administration of justice and
contrary to DR 1-102 (A)(5). People v. Attorney A., 861 P.2d 705 (Colo.
1993).
Attorney's effort to condition settlement of a malpractice claim
upon client's agreement not to file a grievance against him constituted
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of
paragraph (A)(5). People v. Moffitt, 801 P.2d 1197 (Colo. 1990).
Adopting a conscious scheme to take ownership of homes, collect rents
from tenants, make virtually no efforts to sell the homes, and permit
foreclosures to occur on which the department of housing and urban development
(HUD) would absorb the losses constituted equity skimming
in violation of § 18-5-802 and constitutes a violation of sections
(A)(4) and (A)(6) for which suspension for one year is appropriate. People
v. Phelps, 837 P.2d 755 (Colo. 1992).
As officers of the court, lawyers are charged with obedience
to the laws of this state and to the laws of the United States,
and intentional violation by them of these laws subjects them to
the severest discipline. People v. Wilson, 176 Colo. 389, 490
P.2d 954 (1971).
The crime with which an attorney is charged is
one of serious consequences denoting moral turpitude and he is
found guilty of such a crime, he cannot, in good conscience, be
permitted to practice law in this state. People v. Wilson, 176
Colo. 389, 490 P.2d 954 (1971).
It is unprofessional conduct and dishonorable to deal
other than candidly with the facts in drawing affidavits and other
documents. People v. Radinsky, 176 Colo. 357, 490 P.2d 951 (1971).
By filing false documents, an attorney perpetrates a fraud
upon the court. People v. Radinsky, 176 Colo. 357, 490 P.2d 951 (1971).
Where an attorney receives as a fee from one of his
clients stolen property, then even though he does ask the client
whether the item was stolen and receives a negative answer from him,
he should make further inquiry as to the actual source of the item,
and failure to do so constitutes a breach of his obligations as a
member of the bar. People v. Zelinger, 179 Colo. 379, 504 P.2d 668
(1972) (stolen car).
License to practice law assures public that the lawyer who holds the
license will perform basic legal tasks honestly and without undue delay,
in accordance with the highest standards of professional conduct. People
v. Witt, 200 Colo. 522, 616 P.2d 139 (1980);
People v. Dixon, 621 P.2d 322 (Colo. 1981);
People v. Kendrick, 646 P.2d 337 (Colo. 1982).
An attorney must adhere with dedication to the highest standards of
honesty and integrity in order that members of the public are assured
that they may deal with attorneys with the knowledge
that their matters will be handled with absolute propriety.
People v. Golden, 654 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1982).
Client has right to expect competency and integrity from lawyer.
A client has every right to expect that conduct taken on its behalf will
be carried out with that competence and integrity ideally shared by every
lawyer who is licensed to practice law in the jurisdiction. Williams v.
Burns, 463 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Colo. 1979); People v. Pooley, 774 P.2d 239 (Colo. 1989).
Public expects appropriate discipline for misconduct.
The public has a right to expect that one who engages in professional
misconduct will be disciplined appropriately. People v. Witt 200 Colo.
522, 616 P.2d 139 (1980);
People v. Dixon, 621 P.2d 322 (Colo. 1981).
Most severe punishment is required when a lawyer disregards his
professional obligations and converts his clients' funds to his own use.
People v. Kluver, 199 Colo. 511, 611 P.2d 971 (1980);
People v. Kendrick, 646 P.2d 337 (Colo. 1982);
People v. Bealmear, 655 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1982).
Conversion of client funds is conduct warranting disbarment because it
destroys the trust essential to the attorney-client relationship, severely
damages the public's perception of attorneys, and erodes public confidence
in our legal system. People v. Radosevich, 783 P.2d 841 (Colo. 1989).
Where attorney, as trustee, withdrew $13,100 from the trust without the
client-settlor's knowledge and refused to repay the money when given the
opportunity by the client-settlor, attorney's conduct was sufficient to warrant
disbarment. People v. Whitcomb, 819 P.2d 493 (Colo. 1991).
Conversion of client funds cannot be tolerated regardless of the
apparent fact that the attorney did not use such funds for personal gain
but to pay the costs and expenses incident to handling a
large practice that included many non-paying clients. People v. Franco,
698 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1985).
Fitness to practice law adversely reflected upon by attorney's
business judgment and violations of the code of professional responsibility
although his legal competence was not questioned.
People v. Franco, 698 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1985).
Failure to represent a client also adversely reflects upon an
attorney's fitness to practice law. People v. Coca, 732 P.2d 640 (Colo. 1987).
Attorney should never obstruct justice or judicial process.
An attorney has a high duty as an officer of the court to never participate
in any scheme to obstruct the administration of justice or the judicial
process. People v. Kenelly, 648 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1982); People v. Haase,
781 P.2d 80 (Colo. 1989).
Submission of false transcript to obtain admission to law school and
to qualify for admission as a member of the bar is a violation of this rule
and requires that respondent's admission to the bar be voided.
People v. Culpepper, 645 P.2d 5 (Colo. 1982).
Failure to disclose a misdemeanor conviction in another state when
applying for the bar and subsequent disbarment from the other state
constitutes conduct involving fraud,
deceit, and misrepresentation prejudicial to the administration of justice.
People v. Mattox, 639 P.2d 397 (Colo. 1982).
Lawyer owes obligation to client to act with diligence in handling
his client's legal work and in his representation of his client in court.
People v. Bugg, 200 Colo. 512, 616 P.2d 133 (1980).
Failure to take any action on behalf of his client after he was
retained and entrusted
with work and in making representations to his client which were false,
an attorney violates the code of professional responsibility and
C.R.C.P. 241.6. People v. Southern, 638 P.2d 787 (Colo. 1982).
Fact that attorney informed client that workers' compensation hearing was cancelled
due to attorney's illness when attorney was actually
abandoning practice constituted conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation in violation of this rule. People v. Felker, 770 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1989).
Fabricating documents to justify conduct breaches attorney's ethical
obligations to his client and to the bar. People v. Yost, 729 P.2d 348
(Colo. 1986).
Falsification of an adoption decree with the original intent to use it
for a fraudulent purpose is forgery in violation of § 18-5-103 and is a
violation of DR 1-102 and DR 7-102 whether of not the attorney who
falsified the decree actually used or attempted to use the decree. People v.
Marmon, 903 P.2d 651 (Colo. 1995).
Absence of contempt finding by trial court concerning attorney's
willful
failure to pay child support is a non-dispositive factor to be considered
when imposing discipline. People v. Kolenc, 887 P.2d 1024 (Colo. 1994).
Trial court's finding in child support hearing that attorney willfully
violated child support order should be accorded collateral estoppel effect
before the hearing board as long as court makes finding by clear and
convincing evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Kolenc, 887 P.2d
1024 (Colo. 1994).
Attorney violated this rule and C.R.P.C. 1.1 when he prepared and
filed child support worksheets that failed to properly reflect the new
stipulation concerning custody. People v. Davies, 926 P.2d 572 (Colo. 1996).
Lawyer may not secretly record any conversation he has with another
lawyer or person. People v. Selby, 198 Colo. 386, 606 P.2d 45 (1979).
Telephone conversation, which attorney initiated and recorded without the
permission of other party to conversation established unethical conduct
on attorney's part.
People v. Wallin, 621 P.2d 330 (Colo. 1981).
Inherent in the undisclosed use of a recording device is an element of
deception, artifice, and trickery which does not comport with the high
standards of candor and fairness by which all attorneys are bound. People
v. Selby, 198 Colo. 386, 606 P.2d 45 (1979); People v. Smith, 778 P.2d 685
(Colo. 1989).
Suspension from practice in tax court is a determination of
misconduct in another jurisdiction constituting grounds for discipline
under these rules. People v. Hartman, 744 P.2d 482 (Colo. 1987).
Unfounded assertion of attorney's lien violates professional code.
The assertion of an attorney's lien in circumstances where the attorney
has no statutory or legal foundation for a lien and, in fact, has only an
uncertain claim to the fee on which the purported lien is founded violates
the code of professional responsibility.
People v. Razatos, 636 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1981),
appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 930, 102 S. Ct. 1415, 71 L.Ed.2d 639 (1982).
Willful and knowing failure to make a federal income tax return is
an offense involving moral turpitude.
People v. Emeson, 638 P.2d 293 (Colo. 1981).
Both the charges and the well pleaded complaint are deemed admitted
by the entry of a default judgment. People v. Richards, 748 P.2d 341
(Colo. 1987).
Continued representation of clients with conflicting interests
violates this rule and warrants discipline.
People v. Awenius, 653 P.2d 740 (Colo. 1982).
Attorney's representation of two estates where the beneficiaries of the
estates had conflicting interests and the attorney fails to obtain waivers
from the beneficiaries is a violation of this rule. People v. Gebauer, 821
P.2d 782 (Colo. 1991).
Attorney violated this rule by lying to grievance committee counsel
regarding the return of client's files. People v. Felker, 770 P.2d 402 (Colo.
1989).
Conduct found to violate disciplinary rules.
People v. Bugg, 635 P.2d 881 (Colo. 1981);
People v. Sachs, 732 P.2d 633 (Colo. 1987);
People v. Ross, 810 P.2d 659 (Colo. 1991).
Conduct held to violate this rule.
People v. Goss, 646 P.2d 334 (Colo. 1982).
Applied in
People v. Spiegel, 193 Colo. 161, 567 P.2d 353 (1977);
People v. Schermerhorn, 193 Colo. 364, 567 P.2d 799 (1977);
People v. Pittam, 194 Colo. 104, 572 P.2d 135 (1977);
People v. Good, 195 Colo. 177, 576 P.2d 1020 (1978);
People v. McMichael, 196 Colo. 128, 586 P.2d 1 (1978);
People v. Susman, 196 Colo. 458, 587 P.2d 782 (1978);
People v. Harthun, 197 Colo. 1, 593 P.2d 324 (1979);
People v. Cameron, 197 Colo. 330, 595 P.2d 677 (1979);
People ex rel. Aisenberg v. Young, 198 Colo. 26, 599 P.2d 257 (1979);
People v. Pacheco, 198 Colo. 455, 608 P.2d 333 (1979);
People ex rel. Gallagher v. Hertz, 198 Colo. 522, 608 P.2d 335 (1979);
People ex rel. Silverman v. Anderson, 200 Colo. 76, 612 P.2d 94 (1980);
People v. Hilgers, 200 Colo. 211, 612 P.2d 1134 (1980);
People v. Lanza, 200 Colo. 241, 613 P.2d 337 (1980);
People v. Meldahl, 200 Colo. 332, 615 P.2d 29 (1980);
People v. Hurst, 200 Colo. 537, 618 P.2d 1113 (1980);
People v. Kendrick, 619 P.2d 65 (Colo. 1980);
People v. Gottsegen, 623 P.2d 878 (Colo. 1981);
People v. Luxford, 626 P.2d 675 (Colo. 1981);
People v. Rotenberg, 635 P.2d 220 (Colo. 1981);
People v. Wright, 638 P.2d 251 (Colo. 1981);
People v. Kane, 638 P.2d 253 (Colo. 1981);
People v. Archuleta, 638 P.2d 255 (Colo. 1981);
Law Offices of Bernard D. Morley, P.C. v. MacFarlane,
647 P.2d 1215 (Colo. 1982);
People v. Whitcomb, 676 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1983);
People v. Tucker, 676 P.2d 680 (Colo. 1983);
People v. Bollinger, 681 P.2d 950 (Colo. 1984);
People v. Underhill, 683 P.2d 349 (Colo. 1984);
People v. Simon, 698 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1985);
People v. McDowell, 718 P.2d 541 (Colo. 1986);
People v. Smith, 778 P.2d 685 (Colo. 1989).
II.DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS.
A.Public Censure.
Violation of election laws sufficient to justify public censure.
People v. Casias, 646 P.2d 391 (Colo. 1982).
Bigamy, an offense of moral turpitude, warrants public censure.
People v. Tucker, 755 P.2d 452 (Colo. 1988).
An attorney's inaction in response to the grievance committee's request
concerning informal complaint filed, considered with other circumstances,
justified public censure. People v. Moore, 681 P.2d 480 (Colo. 1984).
Where an attorney repeatedly issued checks from his law office account
knowing that they would not be paid by the bank, such conduct, considered
with other circumstances, justified public
censure. People v. Moore, 681 P.2d 480 (Colo. 1984).
Public censure warranted where attorney kept the first lump sum check
obtained in settlement as a lump sum payment of his contingency fee and
reimbursement of costs even though he knew the settlement might later be
reduced
by the social security disability award and the client's union award. People
v. Maceau, 910 P.2d 692 (Colo. 1996).
Adjudicating, as a judge, the criminal case of a person who is his client
in a divorce proceeding warrants public
censure because it is the duty of an attorney-judge to promptly disclose
conflicts of interest and to disqualify himself without suggestion from
anyone.
People v. Perrott, 769 P.2d 1075 (Colo. 1989).
Conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice and
warranted public censure where, during the course of criminal
proceedings, attorney made an offer to the deputy district attorney
to dismiss a related civil action if the criminal charges against
his client were dismissed. People v. Silvola, 888 P.2d 244 (Colo.
1995).
Use of racial epithet by prosecutor
in discussing case with defense counsel for two Hispanic defendants
constituted a violation of this section warranting public censure. People
v. Sharpe, 781 P.2d 659 (Colo. 1989).
Neglect of a legal matter ordinarily warranting a letter of admonition
by way of reprimand requires imposition of public censure when such
conduct is repeated after three letters of admonition. People v. Goodwin,
782 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1989).
Public censure was appropriate where an already suspended attorney
was the subject of prior discipline for misdemeanor convictions of assault
and
driving while impaired and where an additional period of suspension would
have
little, if any, practical effect and would not have afforded a meaningful
measure of protection for the public. People v. Flores, 871 P.2d 1182 (Colo.
1994).
Evidence sufficient to justify public censure.
People v. Hertz, 638 P.2d 794 (Colo. 1982).
Public censure was appropriate where lawyer's actions involving criminal
activity did not seriously affect the lawyer's fitness to practice law and
mitigating factors were present in the absence of any aggravating factors.
People v. Fahselt, 807 P.2d 586 (Colo. 1991).
Public censure was appropriate where multiple representations and neglect
caused no actual harm and attorney was cooperative during disciplinary
proceedings, had no prior discipline, and was relatively inexperienced at the
time the misconduct occurred. People v. Ramseur, 897 P.2d 1391 (Colo. 1995).
Threatening to invoke disciplinary proceedings against judge in
anticipation of adverse ruling warrants public censure.
People v. Tatum, 814 P.2d 388 (Colo. 1991).
Failure to timely file a paternity action constitutes neglect of a
legal matter that warrants public censure. People v. Good, 790 P.2d 331
(Colo. 1990).
Public censure was warranted where attorney made false statements in the
course of discovery in cases where the attorney was the plaintiff.
Evidence
showed that the attorney was suffering from a psychiatric condition at the
time, and the assistant disciplinary counsel could not prove that the
attorney's false statements were knowing, but only that they were negligent.
People v. Dillings, 880 P.2d 1220 (Colo. 1994).
Public censure was appropriate where attorney failed to provide a
critical document to opposing counsel after agreeing to do so and failed to
reveal relevant information at the time of trial. People v. Wilder,
860 P.2d 523 (Colo. 1993).
Failure to inform arbitrators of errors in expert witness' testimony
constituted violation
of DR 7-102 warranting public censure because attorney did not disclose that
expert had informed attorney of mistakes in writing, and attorney made
closing arguments based on uncorrected expert conclusions. People v.
Bertagnolli, 861 P.2d 717 (Colo. 1993) (decided under DR 7-102).
Public censure was appropriate where attorney's failure to
appear at three hearings violated subsection (A)(5) and, in
aggravation, there was a pattern of misconduct. People v. Cabral,
888 P.2d 245 (Colo. 1995).
Public censure warranted where attorney engaged in sexual relations with
client attorney represented in dissolution of marriage action even though
client suffered no
actual harm. People v. Zeilinger, 814 P.2d 808 (Colo. 1991).
Discharging firearm in direction of spouse while intoxicated, although
not a crime involving dishonesty, goes beyond mere negligence and public
censure is appropriate. Mitigating factors, although present, were
insufficient
to warrant making censure private. People v. Senn, 824 P.2d 822 (Colo.
1992).
Public censure is appropriate for attorney's negligence in closing
estates in an untimely manner and for representing two estates where the
beneficiaries of the estates have conflicting interests and the attorney
fails to
obtain waivers from the beneficiaries. People v. Gebauer, 821 P.2d 782
(Colo. 1991).
Attorney's unlawful assertion of charging lien against client's share of
estate proceeds following client's demand for return of property is subject
to public censure. People v. Mills, 861 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1993) (decided under
DR 1-102 (A)(5)).
Public censure is appropriate where lawyer's predominant mental state was
one of negligence and there was an absence of actual harm to the client.
People v. Hickox, 889 P.2d 47 (Colo. 1995).
Public censure is appropriate if attorney's course of behavior
exhibits a serious error in judgment going beyond simple negligence. People
v. Blundell, 901 P.2d 1268 (Colo. 1995).
Public censure was appropriate where the attorney failed to cooperate
in a disciplinary investigation, made frivolous motions, and made a statement
with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity
concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge. People v. Thomas, 925
P.2d 1081 (Colo. 1996).
Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary
rules
is sufficient to justify public censure. People v. Ashley, 796 P.2d 962
(Colo. 1990);
People v. Mulvihill, 814 P.2d 805 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Smith, 819 P.2d 497 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Richardson, 820 P.2d 1120 (Colo 1991);
People v. Dalton, 840 P.2d 351 (Colo. 1992);
People v. Vsetecka, 893 P.2d 1309 (Colo. 1995);
People v. Wollrab, 909 P.2d 1093 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Fitzgibbons, 909 P.2d 1098 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Cohan, 913 P.2d 523 (Colo. 1996).
Conduct violating this rule sufficient to justify public censure.
People v. Bollinger, 648 P.2d 620 (Colo. 1982);
People v. Driscoll, 716 P.2d 1086 (Colo. 1986);
People v. Mayer, 716 P.2d 1094 (Colo. 1986);
People v. Carpenter, 731 P.2d 726 (Colo. 1987);
People v. Schaiberger, 731 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1987);
People v. Horn, 738 P.2d 1186 (Colo. 1987);
People v. Stauffer, 745 P.2d 240 (Colo. 1987);
People v. Barr, 748 P.2d 1302 (Colo. 1988);
People v. Dowhan, 759 P.2d 4 (Colo. 1988);
People v. Fieman, 778 P.2d 830 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Stayton, 798 P.2d 903 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Brinn, 801 P.2d 1195 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Moffitt, 801 P.2d 1197 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Barr, 805 P.2d 440 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Shunneson, 814 P.2d 800 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Reichman, 819 P.2d 1035 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Gebauer, 821 P.2d 782 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Dillings, 880 P.2d 1220 (Colo. 1994);
People v. Wollrab, 909 P.2d 1093, (Colo. 1996).
B.Suspension.
Preparing false carbon copies of correspondence to a client
and testifying falsely to grievance committee of the supreme court
concerning these letters warrants suspension from practice of law
for period of at least three years, but not disbarment. People v.
Klein, 179 Colo. 408, 500 P.2d 1181 (1972).
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that false
statements or documents are being submitted to the court, or that material
information is improperly being withheld, takes no remedial action, and
causes
injury or potential injury to a party to the legal proceeding, or causes an
adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding, or when a
lawyer knows that he is violating a court order or rule and there is injury
or
potential injury to a client or a party, or interference or potential
interference with a legal proceeding. People v. Walker, 832 P.2d 935 (Colo.
1992).
One-year suspension warranted where attorney failed to promptly
respond to discovery requests, failed to inform client of case progress
after
custody hearing, failed to withdraw upon client's request, failed to advise
client of child support modification hearing, misrepresented to the court
that he was
unable to contact client, and had been previously suspended for similar
misconduct. People v. Regan, 871 P.2d 1184 (Colo. 1994).
Fraud, jury tampering, and excessive fees are basis for
indefinite suspension. See People v. Radinsky, 176 Colo. 357, 490
P.2d 951 (1971).
Attorney suspended for three years for
repeated neglect and delay in handling legal matters, failure to comply
with the directions contained in a letter of admonition, failure to answer
letter of complaint from the grievance committee, and conviction of a
misdemeanor. People v. Hebenstreit, 764 P.2d 51 (Colo. 1988).
By commingling trust funds with his own,
failing to maintain complete records of his client's funds, and
failure to render appropriate accounts to his client, the attorney's
conduct adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law, justifying
suspension from practice.
People v. Wright, 698 P.2d 1317 (Colo. 1985).
For commingling of funds in trust account warranting suspension
from practice, see People v. Calvert, 721 P.2d 1189 (Colo. 1986).
Recommendation of prosecution without legitimate interest warrants
suspension. Where an attorney took advantage of his position of respect
and status in a district attorney's office by repeatedly urging criminal prosecution in
matters where his only legitimate professional interest could be in related
civil matters, such actions are prejudicial to the administration of justice
in violation of paragraph (A) (5). People ex rel. Gallagher v. Hertz, 198
Colo. 522, 608 P.2d 335 (1979).
Actions taken by attorney contrary to court order violate this rule
and justify suspension.
People v. Awenius, 653 P.2d 740 (Colo. 1982).
Suspension is appropriate discipline given number and severity of
instances of misconduct, including pattern of neglect over clients' affairs
over lengthy period and in variety of circumstances and misrepresentation
in dissolution case to client who wished to remarry concerning the filing
of a dissolution petition. Considering proper mitigating factors such as
attorney's lack of experience, absence of prior discipline,
attorney's willingness
to undergo psychiatric evaluation and accept transfer to disability inactive
status, suspension without credit for time on disability inactive status
is appropriate. People v. Griffin, 764 P.2d 1166 (Colo. 1988).
Suspension is appropriate for a lawyer addicted to alcohol and cocaine and
who neglected a client's case resulting in the entry of default judgment, but
who entered into an uncompelled restitution agreement and successfully
completed substance abuse treatment. People v. Richtsmeier, 802 P.2d 471
(Colo. 1990).
Attorney misconduct of
neglecting a guardianship matter and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice warrant 90-day suspension when aggravated by
history of five
prior instances of disciplinary offenses for neglect, pattern of
misconduct,
refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct, vulnerability of victim,
and
substantial experience in the practice of law. People v. Dolan, 813 P.2d
733 (Colo. 1991).
Conduct manifesting gross carelessness in representation of clients
is sufficient to justify suspension. People v. Roehl, 655 P.2d 1381 (Colo.
1983); People v. Fahrney, 782 P.2d 743 (Colo. 1989).
Attorney's neglect of dissolution case and misrepresentation to client
concerning the filing of dissolution petition was especially egregious in
view of client's desire to remarry. Such conduct in addition to
number and severity of other instances of misconduct, taking into account
mitigating factors, is sufficient for suspension. People v. Griffin, 764
P.2d 1166 (Colo. 1988).
Felony theft held sufficient grounds for suspension.
People v. Petrie, 642 P.2d 519 (Colo. 1982).
Photocopying another attorney's securities opinion letter and
presenting it as one's own, refusing to comply with discovery rules and
court orders in litigation to which one is a party, and
continuously failing to answer grievance complaint without good cause
warrants suspension. People v. Spangler, 676 P.2d 674 (Colo. 1983).
An attorney's conduct in borrowing money from his former clients and in
failing to record deeds of trust on their behalf to be used as security
constitutes professional misconduct and justifies his suspension.
People v. Brackett, 667 P.2d 1357 (Colo. 1983).
Where attorney engaged in a pattern of neglect, obvious conflict, and
caused injury to his clients, suspension is warranted. People v. Belina,
765 P.2d 121 (Colo. 1988).
Evidence sufficient to justify suspension from the practice of law.
People v. Belfor, 197 Colo. 223, 591 P.2d 585 (1979);
People v. Stineman, 716 P.2d 1079 (Colo. 1986).
Both the charges and the well pleaded complaint are deemed admitted
by the entry of a default judgment. People v. Richards, 748 P.2d 341
(Colo. 1987); People v. McMahill, 782 P.2d 336 (Colo. 1988).
Suspended attorney must demonstrate rehabilitation for readmittance to
bar. Actions of a suspended attorney who took part in a complex real
estate transaction and engaged in the practice of law by representing,
counseling, advising,
and assisting a former client warranted suspension until he demonstrates
by clear and convincing evidence that (1) he has been rehabilitated; (2)
he has complied with and will continue to comply with all applicable
disciplinary orders and rules; and (3) he is competent and fit to practice
law. People v. Belfor, 200 Colo. 44, 611 P.2d 979 (1980).
Where a practicing attorney breached fiduciary duties to his client in
misrepresenting his dealings and in handling of funds given to him in trust,
his conduct warranted disbarment, and before he may seek readmittance to
the state bar association, he must first demonstrate to the grievance committee
that rehabilitation has occurred and that he is entitled to a new start.
People ex rel. Buckley v. Beck, 199 Colo. 482, 610 P.2d 1069 (Colo. 1980).
Attorney's payment to inmates for referrals to attorney for the
provision
of legal services justifies 60-day suspension. People v. Shipp, 793 P.2d
574 (Colo. 1990); People v. Whitaker, 814 P.2d 812 (Colo. 1991).
Three-month suspension appropriate where attorney intentionally
misrepresented that he possessed automobile insurance coverage to
automobile
accident victim, police officer, and grievance committee investigator, and
where
attorney was previously publicly censured for engaging in lengthy delay
tactics. People v. Dowhan, 814 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1991).
Reckless disregard for the propriety of submitting multiple and duplicative
billing in court-appointed cases constitutes knowing conduct warranting a
90-day suspension. People v. Walker, 832 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1992).
Repeated drawings of checks upon insufficient funds and misuse of trust
account moneys constituted grounds for suspension. People v. Lamberson, 802
P.2d 1098 (Colo. 1990).
Attorney's failure to file personal state and federal income tax returns
and to pay withholding taxes for federal income taxes and FICA, and use of
cocaine and marijuana constitute conduct warranting suspension for one year
and one day. People v. Holt, 832 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1992).
Suspension for one year and one day warranted where attorney
misrepresented to client that a trial had been scheduled, that
continuances and new trial settings had been made, that a settlement
had been reached, and where the attorney's previous, similar
discipline, was a significant aggravating factor. People v. Smith,
888 P.2d 248 (Colo. 1995).
Suspension for one year and one day warranted for attorney who
"represented" client for a period of 19 months without that person's
knowledge or consent, even asserting a counterclaim on his behalf without
talking to him; who did not communicate with him in any manner for an
extended period of time and then did not withdraw within a reasonable time
after being unable to contact him; and who failed to answer discovery
requests, resulting in the entries of default and then a default judgment
against him. People v. Silvola, 915 P.2d 1281 (Colo. 1996).
Suspension for one year and one day is warranted for commingling and
misuse of client funds. The hearing board found that the respondent acted
recklessly, rather than knowingly, in misappropriating client funds.
People v. Zimmermann, 922 P.2d 325 (Colo. 1996).
Suspension of one year and one day necessary where lawyer engaged in
sexual relationship with client, had been previously disciplined, and
submitted false evidence to the hearing board concerning the sexual
relationship. People v. Good, 893 P.2d 101 (Colo. 1995).
Suspension of one year and one day warranted in light of the
seriousness of attorney's misconduct in conjunction with his noncooperation
in the disciplinary proceedings and his substantial experience in the practice
of law. People v. Clark, 900 P.2d 129 (Colo. 1995).
Suspension for one year and one day warranted where attorney billed
for time that was not actually devoted to work contemplated by contract and
for time not actually performed. People v. Shields, 905 P.2d 608 (Colo. 1995).
Suspension for one year and one day was warranted for attorney who
violated this rule and C.R.P.C. 1.1 by preparing and filing child support
worksheets that failed to properly reflect the new stipulation concerning
custody and where aggravating factors included a previous disciplinary
history
and failure to appear in the grievance proceedings. People v. Davies, 926
P.2d 572 (Colo. 1996).
Mental disability that caused misconduct is a mitigating factor which,
when considered in conjunction with other factors, justifies suspension of
attorney for conversion of funds that would otherwise warrant disbarment.
People v. Lujan, 890 P.2d 109 (Colo. 1995).
District attorney's failure to prosecute personal friend for possession
of marijuana violates paragraphs (A)(1), (A)(5), and (A)(6) of this rule
and warrants three-year suspension. People v. Larsen, 808 P.2d 1265 (Colo.
1991).
Suspension of lawyer for three years, which is the longest possible
period for suspension, is appropriate where there was extensive pattern of
client neglect and intentional deception in client matters over a period of
years. Anything less would be too lenient. People v. Hellewell, 811 P.2d
386 (Colo. 1991).
Suspension justified where respondent violated federal and state laws
by failing to file personal income tax returns, failing to pay withholding
taxes, using cocaine, and using marihuana. People v. Holt, 832 P.2d 948
(Colo. 1992).
The fact that no specific client of the respondent was actually harmed by
the respondent's misconduct misses the point in proceeding for suspension of
an attorney. While the primary purpose of attorney discipline is the
protection of the public and not to mete punishment to the offending lawyer,
lawyers are, nonetheless, charged with obedience to the law, and intentional
violation of those laws subjects an attorney to the severest discipline.
People v. Holt, 832 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1992).
Felony convictions warrant suspension for attorney convicted of
violating
California Tax Code where numerous mitigating factors were found to exist.
People v. Mandell, 813 P.2d 732 (Colo. 1991).
Three-year suspension appropriate where attorney was convicted for felony
distribution of cocaine, but had no record of prior discipline, there was no
selfish or dishonest motive associated with crime, and the attorney
successfully participated in interim rehabilitation programs. People v.
Rhodes, 829 P.2d 850 (Colo. 1992).
Failure to communicate with clients, court, and opposing counsel,
misrepresentation of the status of the proceedings to client, and failure to
investigate clients' case justifies three-year suspension. People v. Wilson,
814 P.2d 791 (Colo. 1991).
Abusive, insulting, and unprofessional conduct towards deponent and
opposing counsel during deposition and repeated instances of using health as
an excuse for continuances when respondent was ill-prepared for trial
warrants six-month suspension. People v. Genchi, 824 P.2d 815 (Colo. 1992).
Adopting a conscious scheme to take ownership of homes, collect rents
from tenants, make virtually no efforts to sell the homes, and permit
foreclosures to occur on which HUD would absorb the losses constituted equity
skimming
in violation of § 18-5-802 and constitutes a violation of sections
(A)(4) and (A)(6) for which suspension for one year is appropriate. People
v. Phelps, 837 P.2d 755 (Colo. 1992).
Attorney who employed devices to defraud, made untrue statements of material fact,
and engaged in acts which operated as fraud or deceit upon persons in violation of the
Securities and Exchange Act violated DR 1-102 (A)(4) and DR 1-102 (A)(6) for which
suspension of two years is appropriate, considering mitigating factors. People v. Hanks, 967
P.2d 141 (Colo. 1998).
Attorney who conveyed real property to defraud creditors suspended from
the practice of law. In mitigation, the attorney had fully cooperated
with the board. People v. Koller, 873 P.2d 761 (Colo. 1994).
Respondent's multiple acts of violence are indicative of a dangerous
volatility which might well prejudice his ability to effectively represent
his client's interests. Although respondent had taken major steps towards
rehabilitation the acts committed were of such gravity as to require a public
censure and a three-month suspension. People v. Wallace, 837 P.2d 1223
(Colo. 1992).
Third-degree sexual assault of wife adequate basis for one-year and
one day suspension. People v. Brailsford, 933 P.2d 592 (Colo. 1997).
Suspension for 180 days is warranted based upon conviction of third
degree assault charges. People v. Knight, 883 P.2d 1055 (Colo. 1994).
Willful nonpayment of child support and failure to pay arrearages after
ordered by court to do so are violations of subsections (A)(5) and (A)(6)
and constitute adequate basis for six-month suspension. People v. Tucker,
837 P.2d 1225 (Colo. 1992).
Where deputy district attorney was convicted of possession of cocaine under
federal law, one-year suspension is appropriate due to seriousness of
offense and fact that attorney had higher responsibility to the public by
virtue of engaging in law enforcement. People v. Robinson, 839 P.2d 4 (Colo.
1992).
Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary
rules is sufficient to justify suspension.
People v. Murphy, 778 P.2d 658 (Colo. 1989);
People v. Hodge, 782 P.2d 25 (Colo. 1989);
People v. Masson, 782 P.2d 335 (Colo 1989);
People v. Chappell, 783 P.2d 838 (Colo. 1989);
People v. Moya, 793 P.2d 1154 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Creasey, 793 P.2d 1159 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Schmad, 793 P.2d 1162 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Wilbur, 796 P.2d 976 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Baptie, 796 P.2d 978 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Schubert, 799 P.2d 388 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Taylor, 799 P.2d 930 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Barber, 799 P.2d 936 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Garrett, 802 P.2d 1082 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Sullivan, 802 P.2d 1091 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Rhodes, 803 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Flores, 804 P.2d 192 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Crimaldi, 804 P.2d 863 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Dunsmoor, 807 P.2d 561 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Bennett, 810 P.2d 661 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Hall, 810 P.2d 1069 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Koeberle, 810 P.2d 1072 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Gaimara, 810 P.2d 1076 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Dash, 811 P.2d 36 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Honaker, 814 P.2d 785 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Anderson, 817 P.2d 1035 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Redman, 819 P.2d 495 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Rader, 822 P.2d 950 (Colo. 1992);
People v. Hyland, 830 P.2d 1000 (Colo. 1992);
People v. Smith, 830 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1992);
People v. Driscoll, 830 P.2d 1019 (Colo. 1992);
People v. Raubolt, 831 P.2d 462 (Colo. 1992);
People v. Regan, 831 P.2d 893 (Colo. 1992);
People v. Southern, 832 P.2d 946 (Colo. 1992);
People v. Denton, 839 P.2d 6 (Colo. 1992);
People v. Hindorff, 860 P.2d 526 (Colo. 1993);
People v. Brown, 863 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1993);
People v. Cole, 880 P.2d 158 (Colo. 1994);
People v. Smith, 880 P.2d 763 (Colo. 1994);
People v. Swan, 893 P.2d 769 (Colo. 1995);
People v. Davis, 893 P.2d 775 (Colo. 1995);
People v. Miller, 913 P.2d 23 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Calvert, 915 P.2d 1310 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Sigley, 917 P.2d 1253 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Boyer, 934 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1997).
Conduct violating this rule sufficient to justify suspension.
People v. Yaklich, 646 P.2d 938 (Colo. 1982);
People v. Craig, 653 P.2d 1115 (Colo. 1982);
People v. Kane, 655 P.2d 390 (Colo. 1982);
People v. Vernon, 660 P.2d 879 (Colo. 1982);
People v. Pilgrim, 698 P.2d 1322 (Colo. 1985);
People v. Convery, 704 P.2d 296 (Colo. 1985);
People v. Doolittle, 713 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1985);
People v. Foster, 716 P.2d 1069 (Colo. 1986);
People v. Coca, 716 P.2d 1073 (Colo. 1986);
People v. Barnett, 716 P.2d 1076 (Colo. 1986);
People v. Fleming, 716 P.2d 1090 (Colo. 1986);
People v. Larson, 716 P.2d 1093 (Colo. 1986);
People v. McPhee, 728 P.2d 1292 (Colo. 1986);
People v. Yost, 729 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1986);
People v. Holmes, 731 P.2d 677 (Colo. 1987);
People v. Proffitt, 731 P.2d 1257 (Colo. 1987);
People v. May, 745 P.2d 218 (Colo. 1987);
People v. Turner, 746 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1987);
People v. Susman, 747 P.2d 667 (Colo. 1987);
People v. Richards, 748 P.2d 341 (Colo. 1987);
People v. Geller, 753 P.2d 235 (Colo. 1988);
People v. Convery, 758 P.2d 1338 (Colo. 1988);
People v. Lustig, 758 P.2d 1342 (Colo. 1988);
People v. Preblud, 764 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1988);
People v. Goldberg, 770 P.2d 408 (Colo. 1989);
People v. Goens, 770 P.2d 1218 (Colo. 1989);
People v. Kaemingk, 770 P.2d 1247, (Colo. 1989);
People v. Fahrney, 782 P.2d 743 (Colo. 1989);
People v. Bottinelli, 782 P.2d 746 (Colo. 1989);
People v. Barnthouse, 775 P.2d 545 (Colo. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1026,
110 S. Ct. 734, 107 L.Ed.2d 752 (1990);
People v. Gregory, 788 P.2d 823 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Macy, 789 P.2d 188 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Lopez, 796 P.2d 957 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Abelman, 804 P.2d 859 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Heilbrunn, 814 P.2d 819 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Barr, 818 P.2d 761 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Nulan, 820 P.2d 111 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Dieters, 825 P.2d 478 (Colo. 1992);
People v. Larson, 828 P.2d 793 (Colo. 1992);
People v. Tisdel, 828 P.2d 795 (Colo. 1992);
People v. Rhodes, 829 P.2d 850 (Colo. 1992);
People v. Walker, 832 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1992);
People v. Koller, 873 P.2d 761 (Colo. 1994);
People v. Dickinson, 903 P.2d 1132 (Colo. 1995);
People v. Kolbjornsen, 917 P.2d 277 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Pierson, 917 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1996).
C.Disbarment.
Disbarment is discipline for lawyer guilty of crimes of
moral turpitude. People v. Wilson, 176 Colo. 389, 490 P.2d 954 (1971).
Attorney disbarred for continued pattern of conduct involving neglect
and misrepresentation and for failure to cooperate in
investigation by grievance committee.
People v. Young, 673 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1984);
People v. Coca, 732 P.2d 640 (Colo. 1987);
People v. Johnston, 759 P.2d 10 (Colo. 1988).
Continuing pattern of neglect, including failure to timely file tax
returns on behalf of personal representative of estate, failure to file
timely notice of alibi, failure to notify opposing counsel, and failure to be
adequately prepared for argument, coupled with similar behavior resulting
in previous suspension, warrants disbarment.
People v. Stewart, 752 P.2d 528 (Colo. 1987).
Misappropriation of funds, failure to account, and deceit and fraud
in handling the affairs of a client necessitate that an attorney be disbarred.
People v. Bealmear, 655 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1982).
A lawyer's knowing misappropriation of funds, whether belonging to a
client or third party, warrants disbarment except in the presence of
extraordinary factors
of mitigation. People v. Lavenhar, 934 P.2d 1355 (Colo. 1997).
Lawyer's encouragement of a client to enter into a business transaction
with said lawyer in which the two had differing interests and lawyer's
failure to disclose relevant facts warrant disbarment. People v.
Martinez, 739 P.2d 838 (Colo. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1054, 108 S. Ct. 1003, 98 L.Ed.2d 970 (1988).
Convictions for crimes of theft, theft-receiving, and
conspiracy to commit theft are serious, involve moral turpitude,
and are grounds for disbarment as opposed to an indefinite suspension.
People v. Silvola, 195 Colo. 74, 575 P.2d 413 (1978).
Conviction of two counts of sexual assault on a child warrants no
less a sanction than disbarment. People v. Grenemyer, 745 P.2d 1027 (Colo.
1987).
Disbarment warranted by attorney's conviction of conspiracy to
deliver counterfeited federal reserve notes, serious neglect of several
legal matters, unjustified retention of clients' property, failure to
respond to the grievance committee, and previous disciplinary record.
People v. Mayer, 752 P.2d 537 (Colo. 1988).
False testimony and counselling of such conduct warrant disbarment.
When a lawyer counsels his client to testify falsely at a hearing on a
bankruptcy petition and the client does so, and the lawyer gives a false
answer to a question asked of him by the bankruptcy judge, his misconduct
warrants disbarment. People v. McMichael, 199 Colo. 433, 609 P.2d 633 (1980).
Misrepresenting the status of a dissolution of marriage action with
knowledge of impending remarriage and then forging the purported decree of
dissolution is conduct involving moral turpitude deserving of
disbarment. People v. Belina, 782 P.2d 26 (Colo. 1989).
Where an attorney demonstrates an extreme indifference to the welfare
of his clients and the status of their cases and an extreme insensitivity
to his professional duties in the face of adverse judgments due to neglect,
client complaints, and repeated disciplinary proceedings, disbarment
is the appropriate sanction. People v. Wyman, 782 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1989).
Abandoning clients sufficient to justify disbarment.
People v. Sanders, 713 P.2d 837 (Colo. 1985).
Abandoning clients without notice, causing them financial losses, and
failing to cooperate with grievance committee justified disbarment despite
lack of any prior professional misconduct.
People v. Lovett, 753 P.2d 205 (Colo. 1988).
Abandoning law practice, engaging in multiple acts of misconduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation grounds for
disbarment. People v. Greene, 773 P.2d 528 (Colo. 1989).
Converting estate or trust funds for one's personal use, overcharging
for services rendered, neglecting to return inquiries relating to client
matters, failing to make candid disclosures to grievance committee, and
attempting to conceal wrongdoing during disciplinary proceedings warrants
the severe sanction of disbarment. People v. Gerdes, 782 P.2d 2 (Colo. 1989).
Use of license to practice law for the purpose of bringing into
being an illegal prostitution enterprise renders disbarment the
only possible form of discipline.
People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986).
Theft of client's money, misrepresentations, representation of
multiple clients with adverse interests, and failure to respond to
informal complaints warrants disbarment.
People v. Quick, 716 P.2d 1082 (Colo. 1986).
Felony theft held sufficient grounds for disbarment in Colorado where
respondent was convicted of crime and disbarred in another jurisdiction.
Unless the disciplinary proceedings conducted in the foreign
jurisdiction involved a denial of due process or other
infirmity, or the imposition of the same discipline would result in a grave
injustice, or the attorney's conduct warrants a substantially different
discipline, the court is required to impose the same discipline.
People v. Bradbury, 772 P.2d 46 (Colo. 1989).
Altering authentic dissolution decrees coupled with past attorney
misconduct sufficient to warrant disbarment.
People v. Blanck, 713 P.2d 832 (Colo. 1985).
Continuing to practice while suspended is conduct justifying
disbarment. People v. James, 731 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1987).
Disbarment in another state warrants disbarment. People v. Montano,
744 P.2d 480 (Colo. 1987); People v. Brunn, 764 P.2d 1165 (Colo. 1988).
Attorney's failure to disclose felony conviction and subsequent disbarment
in another state is sufficient for disbarment. People v. Brunn, 764 P.2d
1165 (Colo. 1988).
Facts sufficient to justify disbarment of attorney for failure to comply
with registration requirements of C.R.C.P. 227, misappropriation of
funds, and improper withdrawal from employment. People v. Scudder,
197 Colo. 99, 590 P.2d 493 (1979).
A lawyer who enters into a conspiracy to violate the law by importing
narcotic drugs for distribution should be disbarred.
People v. Unruh, 621 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1980).
Where a lawyer's conduct not only constitutes a violation of the code of
professional responsibility, but also involves felonious conduct, clearly
and convincingly proven by testimony of sheriff's officers, the grievance
committee is justified in requiring disbarment.
People v. Harfmann, 638 P.2d 745 (Colo. 1981).
Total disregard of obligation to protect a client's rights and
interests over an extended period of time in conjunction with the
violation of a number of disciplinary rules and an extended prior record of
discipline requires most severe sanction of disbarment. People v. O'Leary,
783 P.2d 843 (Colo. 1989).
Attorney's continued practice of law while under an order of suspension,
with no efforts to wind up the legal practice, and the failure to take action
to protect the legal interests of the attorney's clients, warrants
disbarment. People v. Wilson, 832 P.2d 943 (Colo. 1992).
Convictions for conspiring to commit fraud against the United States and
impeding an officer of a United States court warrant disbarment. People v.
Pilgrim, 802 P.2d 1084 (Colo. 1990).
Disbarment was the proper remedy where the attorney was afforded
multiple opportunities including two suspensions and court ordered
rehabilitation and where attorney's conduct demonstrated (a) neglect of
legal matters entrusted to him; (b) misrepresentation to the client and the
grievance committee; and (c) a pattern of neglect followed
by the respondent that had the potential of causing serious injury to his
clients. People v. Susman, 787 P.2d 1119 (Colo. 1990).
A lawyer's continued practice of law while under an order of
suspension, with no efforts to wind up the legal practice, and failure to
take action to protect the legal interests of the lawyer's clients, warrants
disbarment. People v. Wilson, 832 P.2d 943 (Colo. 1992).
Likewise, disbarment was appropriate where attorney removed $5,000 from a
client's trust account, refused to return money upon several requests by the
client which ultimately resulted in a suit against the attorney, and the
attorney lied about the transaction to the attorney with whom he shared
office space. Factors in aggravation included a history of prior discipline,
including suspension for conversion of client funds, the dishonest motive of
the
attorney in removing and not returning the client's funds, the attorney's
refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct, the vulnerability
of the client, and the attorney's legal experience. Mitigating factors were
insufficient for disciplinary action short of disbarment. People v. McGrath,
833 P.2d 731 (Colo. 1992).
Disbarment is essentially automatic when a lawyer converts funds or
property and there are no significant factors in mitigation. People v.
Lujan, 890 P.2d 109 (Colo. 1995).
Entering guilty pleas to multiple counts of bank fraud evidences
serious criminal conduct warranting disbarment. People v. Vidakovich, 810
P.2d 1071 (Colo. 1991).
Payment of restitution required prior to petition for readmission.
Where, in proceedings to enforce a debt, attorney fails to pay debt, appear
for deposition, produce documents requested by subpoena duces tecum or appear
at an examination pursuant to C.R.C.P. 69 and on separate occasions writes
insufficient funds checks and fails to comply with requests for
investigation, restitution is a proper condition of readmission and is to be
made prior to
petition for readmission. People v. Koransky, 830 P.2d 490 (Colo. 1992).
Where money was accepted for investment plans which were false,
fictitious,
and fraudulent and the presence of aggravating factors, including
substantial
experience by attorney, prior disciplinary offenses, dishonest or
selfish motive, presence of multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge the
wrongful nature of conduct, and an indifference to making restitution,
disbarment of attorney for violation of legal ethics was proper. People v.
Kramer, 819 P.2d 77 (Colo. 1991).
Disbarment appropriate where attorney accepted fees from a number of
clients prior to terminating her legal practice, failed to inform her clients
of such termination, failed to refund clients' retainer fees, failed to place
clients' funds in separate account, and gave clients' files to other lawyers
without clients' consent. People v. Tucker, 904 P.2d 1321 (Colo. 1995).
Disbarment warranted where attorney was convicted of two separate sexual
assaults on a client and a former client and attorney's previous dishonest
conduct was an aggravating factor as well as findings of the attorney's
selfish
motive in engaging in the sexual misconduct, the two clients' vulnerability,
the attorney's more than 20 years practicing law, and the attorney's failure
to
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. People v. Bertagnolli, 922
P.2d 935 (Colo. 1996).
Notwithstanding the entry of attorney's "Alford" plea in sexual assault
proceedings,
for purpose of disciplinary proceeding, the attorney was held to have
actually
committed the acts necessary to accomplish third degree sexual assault and
therefore the attorney knowingly had sexual contact with a former client and
with a current client without either woman's consent. People v. Bertagnolli,
922 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1996).
Disbarment appropriate when attorney engages in conduct prejudicial to
client and the administration of justice and neglects numerous legal
matters. People v. Theodore, 926 P.2d 1237 (Colo. 1996).
Notwithstanding financial stress and serious and costly medical problems,
intentional conversion of law firm funds required disbarment. People v.
Guyerson, 898 P.2d 1062 (Colo. 1995).
Propounding interrogatories to harass parties to a case and falsely
accusing judicial officers and others of conspiracy warranted disbarment
where respondent had been
previously suspended for similar conduct. People v. Bottinelli, 926 P.2d 553
(Colo. 1996).
Failure to respond to discovery and motions, failure to attend case
management hearing, and failure to inform client of progress of a civil case
is grounds for disbarment. People v. Hebenstreit, 823 P.2d 125 (Colo.
1992).
Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary
rules is sufficient to justify disbarment. People v. Lyons, 762 P.2d
143 (Colo. 1988); People v. Costello, 781 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1989);
People v. Nichols, 976 P.2d 966 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Bergmann, 807 P.2d 568 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Rhodes, 814 P.2d 787 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Vermillion, 814 P.2d 795 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Bannister, 814 P.2d 801 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Grossenbach, 814 P.2d 810 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Ashley, 817 P.2d 965 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Rouse, 817 P.2d 967 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Calt, 817 P.2d 969 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Mulligan, 817 P.2d 1028 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Margolin, 820 P.2d 347 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Koransky, 824 P.2d 819 (Colo. 1992);
People v. Bradley, 825 P.2d 475 (Colo. 1992);
People v. Mullison, 829 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1992);
People v. Tanquary, 831 P.2d 889 (Colo. 1992);
People v. Southern, 832 P.2d 946 (Colo. 1992);
People v. McGrath, 833 P.2d 731 (Colo. 1992);
People v. Brown, 840 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1992);
People v. Walsh, 880 P.2d 766 (Colo. 1994);
People v. Tyler, 884 P.2d 694 (Colo. 1994);
People v. Kolenc, 887 P.2d 1024 (Colo. 1994);
People v. Fritsche, 897 P.2d 805 (Colo. 1995);
People v. Sims, 913 P.2d 526 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Allbrandt, 913 P.2d 532 (Colo. 1996);
People v. McDowell, 942 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1997);
People v. Singer, 955 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1998).
Conduct violating this rule sufficient to justify disbarment.
People v. Kendrick, 646 P.2d 337 (Colo. 1982);
People v. Dwyer, 652 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1982);
People v. Golden, 654 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1982);
People v. Buckles, 673 P.2d 1008 (Colo. 1984);
People v. Loseke, 698 P.2d 809 (Colo. 1985);
People v. Fitzke, 716 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1986);
People v. Rice, 728 P.2d 714 (Colo. 1986);
People v. Young, 732 P.2d 1208 (Colo. 1987);
People v. Foster, 733 P.2d 687 (Colo. 1987);
People v. Franco, 738 P.2d 1174 (Colo. 1987);
People v. Quintana, 752 P.2d 1059 (Colo. 1988);
People v. Brooks, 753 P.2d 208 (Colo. 1988);
People v. Cantor, 753 P.2d 238 (Colo. 1988);
People v. Turner, 758 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1988);
People v. Danker, 759 P.2d 14 (Colo. 1988);
People v. Score, 760 P.2d 1111 (Colo. 1988);
People v. Hanneman, 768 P.2d 709 (Colo. 1989);
People v. Kengle, 772 P.2d 605 (Colo. 1989);
People v. Vernon, 782 P.2d 745 (Colo. 1989);
People v. Frank, 782 P.2d 769 (Colo. 1989);
People v. Johnston, 782 P.2d 1195 (Colo. 1989);
People v. Hedicke, 785 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Dulaney, 785 P.2d 1302 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Franks, 791 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Gregory, 797 P.2d 42 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Broadhurst, 803 P.2d 478 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Goens, 803 P.2d 480 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Hansen, 814 P.2d 816 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Schwartz, 814 P.2d 793 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Whitcomb, 819 P.2d 493 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Kinkade, 831 P.2d 892 (Colo. 1992);
People v. Marmon, 903 P.2d 651 (Colo. 1995);
People v. Gilbert, 921 P.2d 48 (Colo. 1996).
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